ACTS OF STATE ORGANS 
11 
have discussed them in very concrete form. However, all of these objec- 
tions and new suggestions are entirely too systematic in so far as their 
justification of practical responsibility is concerned. It is manifest, of course, 
that when the injurious consequences of a wrongful act are imputed to the 
State, this cannot involve the question of individual intention, which it 
does not naturally possess. Otherwise, the State could be charged with 
fraud or negligence, should its organs act fraudulently or without due dili- 
gence. There are certain cases, however, in which serious complications 
arise in the construction of these principles; for instance, as Professor 
Anzilotti points out, when the State organ discharges its legal obligations 
under municipal law, which are, on the other hand, contrary to the law of 
Nations. It would seem altogether too artificial to charge either the execu- 
ive or the legislative organs with bad faith in respect of an act the origin 
and development of which are so different from the consequences of 
some act being executed through a period of time in violation of an inter- 
national obligation. Notwithstanding these considerations, it would not be, 
properly speaking, an artifice; but rather a juridical construction, or, in 
other words, a process of legal reasoning similar to the one which estab- 
lishes the legal entity in order to arrive at conclusions that will permit the 
administration of justice. 
In municipal law responsibility has a practical tendency, inasmuch as 
the relations of man require that his interests be duly guaranteed and 
protected. In order to maintain these interests in proper equilibrium, it is 
necessary that in disposing of the patrimony it should be distributed among 
the individuals who bear relation to one another, either through family ties, 
business connection, or membership in the same community. The activities 
of man, either with his capital or with his labor, are complementary elements 
of the same economic system. Those who act in the capacity of agents of a 
community are to be deemed the instruments thereof, and the community 
should bear the injurious consequences incident to every transaction within the 
range of its activities. These very same principles should be applied by 
international law whenever the relationship between principal and agent has 
been properly established. However, the present individualistic tendency 
in the Law of Nations does not, for the time being, permit the absolute 
exclusion of certain cases in which every State should assume a defensive 
position, based on the fact that it has not been a party to the injury, or that 
it was not in a position to prevent it, in spite of having taken every reason- 
able precaution and exercised due diligence to avoid it. 
It is the task of the law to gradually incorporate the various juridical 
tendencies arising out of the necessities of the administration of justice. 
While the smaller States can shield themselves against abusive force by 
pleading their innocence in the cause of certain injuries, the future balance