ARGUMENTS IN THE NEGATIVE 
all countries endeavoring to stabilize their dollar-exchange that the United States 
should not enter upon any monetary policy effectively raising the internal value of 
‘he dollar. In fact, the problem of stabilizing the world’s exchanges being in its na- 
ture an international problem, it is desirable that one country should take the lead 
by fixing the internal value of its money, and it seems natural that this should be the 
United States. 
“In the same manner, it is of great interest for all countries striving to restore a 
definite parity with gold that the value of gold as against commodities should not be 
raised and that, when the new parities once have been settled, the value of gold should 
remain as constant as possible. Though the enormous fall in value of gold since the 
oeginning of the war has certainly been a very injurious process, the inverse process 
of raising the value of gold would probably be still more disastrous. For the gold 
countries it would mean a prolonged process of deflation with all its pernicious effects 
on trade and enterprise and on the financial burdens of the state. For other ‘countries 
it would seriously aggravate the restoration of a pre-war gold parity or the main 
tenance of a new established gold parity.” 
On November 2, 1929, the London Statist reviewed editorially the situation in 
other countries, under the head “The World Credit Crisis,” saying: 
“We are at the present time witnessing a near approximation to an international 
credit crisis. The storm center is now in Wall Street, but before the wholesale 
liquidation in that center made itself felt there had been signs of impending trouble 
in other parts of the world. * * * On the continent of Europe serious bank 
ing difficulties had for some time been apparent. * * * These are some of the 
indications which had recently become observable of a growing malaise in the European 
industrial and financial spheres. In other parts of the world similar indications were 
not lacking. * * * 
“Upon this apprehensive world position came the crash in Wall Street. The boom 
in the American Stock Exchange had long ago ceased to have purely domestic sig 
nificance. In the first place, the eagerness of the American speculator had drawn 
within the vortex of rising prices a large number of shares of non-American com: 
panies—principally Canadian and British. Secondly, the reaction of American credit 
conditions to the extension of stock speculation had in turn had its effect upon the 
whole structure of world credit. The break in the boom was, therefore, bound to 
have immediate repercussions throughout the world. * * * Montreal, by reason 
of its geographical proximity to New York, has been one of the worst sufferers. The 
collapse in the securities market has accentuated some of the difficulties which, for 
many months, have been observable in the Canadian exchange situation and, during 
he current week, the Canadian dollar has fallen in London * * * ell below 
the gold export point for Canada, and it is only by the unofficial but nevertheless 
rigorous application of an embargo on gold exports that substantial quantities of gold 
have not left Canada. * * * Another currency which has recently been forced 
off the gold standard is the Argentine peso. * * * The gold point has been 
passed and it is understood that an unofficial embargo on gold exports has been im- 
posed. These reactionary developments—the forsaking of the gold standard by two 
"Continued on page 25) 
November, 1929 
Credit Abroad 
Gold Standard 
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