RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 
the detriment of others, and their wrongful act would affect the established 
system of justice, would disrupt social unity, provoke a reaction of public 
opinion, would alter the ends of life itself, and seriously menace the funda- 
mental principles of natural justice upon which the peace and welfare of a 
community are utterly dependent. All of these considerations form the 
basis of both municipal and international common law, and they might 
properly complement the conception of equality of States in the international 
sphere and thus explain their responsibility. 
It could not be properly stated that there are two conceptions of responsi- 
bility, one in reference to individuals, and the other pertaining to States; 
for they are both responsible in the same light, this being essential to the 
preservation of peace within the State and among the States. This is indeed 
a practical notion derived from the highest spirit of justice and comity, im- 
posed by logic itself as a paramount necessity of human existence, and 
thus impressed upon the mind of man. The doctrine of legal responsibility 
is unique, and its ground is identical in both municipal and international 
jurisprudence. This unity of the law has already been set forth in doctrine. 
The pronouncement of the Institute of International Law at its session held 
in New York, attributing international character to the rights of man, has 
discarded the distinctions between the two systems of jurisprudence, and 
has constituted an International Community as the common guardian of both 
the individual and the body politic. The rules of conduct which constitute 
the corpus of the law are applied to human relations throughout the world; 
and in the strict juridical conception, these relations are precisely identical 
between individuals and between States. However, their differences arise 
mainly when it is realized that in the relations of individuals, responsibility 
and the law are enforced by a perfectly organized system, which is afforded 
security by a constituted authority; whereas, in the international sphere, 
although the very same principles hold true, they have not been yet fully 
developed. It would be a task beset with difficulties, to undertake the co- 
ordination of the relations of States with one another, or of the character 
of the International Community. These cannot be considered voluntary in 
the sense that States might do without them and live in utter isolation, nor 
are they subject to rules established by the States’ arbitrary will. There 
is in evidence a certain sense of obligation in this International Community, 
and although its working organization is now in the making, it can only 
differ from individual organization in its degree of development. 
There is an International Community in the juridical sphere, dedicated 
to preserve order and peace among the Nations of the World, and founded 
upon the highest sense of justice. ‘Its administration demands that each one 
of the constituent members of the Family of Nations should hold due respect 
towards contractual obligations and observe the general accepted rules and