30 
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 
damage caused in civil wars, riots or rebellions, he proposed the same prin- 
ciple of due diligence which it is usually advisable for the State to exercise 
under such circumstances in order to prevent or check such acts. Profes- 
sor Charles De Visscher stated that the obligation of the State should be 
commensurate with the means at its disposal. Mr. Politis did not accept 
this view, which makes responsibility dependent upon the circumstances of 
the State. “If this doctrine is to be made subject to internal troubles,” Mr. 
Politis said, “it would place disorganized States in an advantageous position, 
and their responsibility would become too limited. In accordance with the 
formula of Mr. De Visscher, where there is the most damage caused by 
internal trouble, there would also exist the least responsibility. The speaker 
suggests, however, that, to a certain extent, the influence of the temporary 
impotence of the State might be taken into consideration in determining its 
international responsibility.” 
However, this resolution of the Institute does not appear to be quite 
in accord with the view of the European governments. The Bases of Dis- 
cussion of the Preparatory Committee mention the cases in which the authori- 
ties have failed to accomplish everything in their power to preserve order, 
or have failed to exercise reasonable diligence to punish those who have 
inflicted injury upon the person or property of an alien. The replies of 
the governments refer, as a rule, to the duty of the State to accomplish 
everything in its power. Other governments prefer the doctrine of reason- 
able diligence or reasonable steps, and one of them (the Government of 
Austria) refers to the conduct of the State that is not what might be usually 
expected of a civilized State. In any event, the prevailing view is not to 
require the State to do the impossible. Its obligation depends upon its 
available means and its circumstances. It should not be conceived, how- 
ever, that these means might be permitted to be so utterly deficient as to 
amount to a practical avoidance of the duty to afford proper protection. On 
the other hand, it would not be proper to think, as Mr. Politis does, that 
the relative lack of development of a State or its temporary disablement 
operates as a sort of punishment upon it, by applying to it the same stand- 
ards of protection expected under normal conditions. Of course, it would 
not be altogether unfair for courts of arbitration to apply this doctrine 
when the lack of development cannot be tolerated, or when the degree of 
disorganization can not be properly explained by the actual circumstances. 
Nevertheless, it is quite possible for situations to arise wherein the mitiga- 
tion of the responsibility, and even utter exemption therefrom, would seem 
only proper. It is advisable to adopt, as regards this question, a formula 
that will be sufficiently flexible to permit the international jurisprudence to 
be guided by principles of justice in its application to the great variety of con- 
crete cases.