ON SLAVE TRADE (EAST COAST OF AFRICA). 
vii 
It has been stated to the Committee that for the performance of the addi 
tional duties which would devolve upon the Consul, should the proposed treaty 
be carried into effect, some increase in the present small staff would be required, 
and it was recommended by witnesses that an officer be appointed at Zanzibar 
to assist the Consul and Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court in all matters 
connected with the slave trade, with the title of Assistant Political Agent and 
Vice Consul at Zanzibar, and to act for him in his absence ; that a Consular 
Officer should aim be appointed at Oar Selam, under the superintendence of 
Her Majesty’s Consul, to whom he should report upon all matters connected 
with the slave trade, the number of slaves exported, and whether the Sultan’s 
engagements with Her Majesty’s Government are strictly observed. This officer 
would be required to visit, from time to time, the various points on the coast, 
and to report whether any irregularities exist, or any illegal exports are carried 
on ; and as it is probable that for some time the slave traders would attempt to 
continue the exportation of slaves from Kilwa, the distance of which from 
Zanzibar and Dar Selam would prevent the British authorities at those places 
from watching and checking such practices, it might be necessary, at first, to 
station a consular officer at that port also. 
It was also stated to the Committee that this proposal was concurred in 
by the Secretary ot State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for India 
in Council, who recommended that, as the duties of the agency and consulate 
at Zanzibar were of a twofold character—one part concerning the Indian, and 
the other the Imperial Government—that the cost of maintenance should be 
equally divided between the Imperial and Indian Governments. , 
This proposal was negatived by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, 
and it was stated in evidence that, in consequence of this refusal and of the 
representation of the Indian Government, Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for 
India in Council had informed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that 
the Foreign Office would no longer be privileged to send any instructions to 
the Zanzibar agent ; and the whole matter, therefore, w as brought to a dead 
lock. 
The principal means used to check the trade have been the employment 
of some vessels of Her Majesty’s Navy upon the East Indian station as cruisers 
to watch the East African Coast during the slaving season, which, depending 
upon the monsoon, is from April to the end of June, and from September to 
the beginning of November. It was stated in evidence that during the years 
1867, 1868, and 1869, there were captured by the squadron 116 dhows, con 
taining 2,645 slaves ; while, according to the returns uf slaves exported from 
Zanzibar and Kilwa during those years, dhows carrying 37,000 slaves must have 
evaded capture, making the captures about 6 6 per cent. only. 
Ihese figures are sufficient to show the insufficiency of the present squadron 
to check, much less to stop, the trade; and the reasons assigned are that the 
existing treaties and the instructions as to domestic slaves render it impossible to 
seize a dhow south of La moo, and during the south-west monsoon it is very 
difficult to keep the cruisers sufficiently near the coast to intercept the dhows as 
they run northward before the wind, while there appears a general concurrence 
of testimony that the present number of the squadron is insufficient for the 
work to be performed, and that the efficiency of the squadron would be mate 
rially increased by an additional supply of steam launches for the arduous boat 
service on that coast. The traffic in slaves was, on the 31st of May 1871, as 
reported by the Admiral Commanding in Chief on the station to be, “without 
doubt, as busy and profitable as ever.” 
In connection with the failure of the measures hitherto adopted it was 
given in evidence that much was owing to the want of recorded information, and 
the necessarily frequent change of commanders, who, moreover, are not supplied 
with the oflScial reports of those who have preceded them, as well as to the 
inefficiency and untrustworthiness of the interpreters employed, who not un fre 
quently are in league with the traders, and mislead the commanders of the 
squadron. 
Evidence given before your Committee shows the very great inconveni 
ence and loss resulting to British residents, and a frequent diversion of trade 
420. a 4 into