SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 61

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If it is formulated in terms of a narrative, it is usually
an interpretation of occurrences in terms of volition and
motives, either personal or collective. In that case the
epistemological inquiry will be mainly an inquiry into the
psychological presuppositions. If it is formulated in terms
of historical laws, it is usually an interpretation in terms of
an inherent dialectic of social institutions and sociological
structures. In that case these structures and institutions
are conceived as purely factual potencies. They are supposed
 to change their forms independently of the conscious
volition of their actual bearers. These may stimulate or
retard the movement, but they cannot prevent it or bring
it about. The explanatory causes are then assumed to lie,
not in the volition of individuals, but in the inherent logic
of these forms and institutions, which expresses itself with
mechanical necessity. Here motive and volition, either personal
 or collective, are left outside of the interpretation,
and the epistemological inquiry will therefore be mainly
concerned with the a priori categories which make possible
a reading of historical laws into successive historical phenomena.
 Most histories use both forms of interpretation,
and the epistemological inquiry into their underlying assumptions
 will therefore deal with both types of presuppositions.!

The metaphysics of history is directed, on the one hand,
toward the completion of knowledge and, on the other
hand, toward the valuation of its content. It asks whether
the stages of social evolution are analogous to the stages
of cosmic evolution in a way which suggests a single formula.
 But, apart from existential judgments, it also asks
for value judgments. It questions whether each single historical
 fact and occurrence has a value in and for itself or
only in relation to the whole historical movement. It asks

L Probl. der Gesch., chap. i, pp. 1-74.