6 
- it is, except in a very few places, on the Navy that the 
burden of countering this menace falls, because we have no 
territory from which our own aeroplanes can fly. Where we 
- have territory from which our aeroplanes can fly, the 
assistance of air force squadrons will be of vital importance. 
. These remarks are in no way intended ‘to belittle the poten- 
_ tialities of air power, indeed the day may come when the 
capital ship. may be mainly an aircraft carrier or even spread 
out wings and fly. (Laughter.) The present Board of Admiralty 
and the Naval Staff are fully alive to the great value of air 
. power at sea, and will spare no endeavour to develop it, but 
as matters stand to-day, we sea-going sailors know that there 
are many days in the year when the existing type of aircraft 
can neither fly on nor off the sea, nor on nor off an aircraft 
carrier. So it will be seen that the advent of the air arm has 
added to rather than ameliorated our difficulties at sea and the 
expenses of safeguarding our sea borne commerce. To return 
to the Mercantile Marine, it needs no words of mine to tell you 
how gallantly they played their part in the War—(Cheers)— 
. whether in bringing us our food, or other vital necessities in 
spite of the submarines, or whether in the dangerous work of 
- sweeping up mines or hunting submarines. (Cheers) We 
all know that, should the supreme test come once again, they 
will not fail us—(Cheers)—and the Navy also will not be 
behindhand in playing their part, if you will give us the men and 
the ships.” You may ask: How many men and ships do you 
want ? Well, the number of men is governed by the number 
of ships, and the number of ships is governed by three things. 
Firstly, at the Imperial Conference of 1921, it was decided 
that our naval strength must never be inferior to that of the 
strongest Naval Power. (Hear, hear.) I need not assure 
you that this is the minimum requirement for the safety of 
the Empire. (Hear, hear.) Secondly, the Washington 
Agreement achieved a limitation in capital ships and aircraft 
carriers. Thirdly, our requirements in cruisers for protecting 
our wide trade. In this latter respect our requirements are 
far greater than those of any other nation, as the Empire is 
dependent on its sea communications. It is true that the 
‘Washington Agreement limited the displacement and armament 
of cruisers, but placed no restriction on numbers, and, of all 
.the great Powers, we alone have no building programme in 
cruiser construction. It is true that, at the moment, in 
numbers we have a superiority over any other single Power, 
though not a superiority having regard to our world-wide 
commitments and geographical position, and even then only 
in. small cruisers constructed during the war for war in the 
North Sea, and not comparable with those which are included