cmap.11] LIMITATION OF LEGISLATION 393
vires of the Dominion Parliament. The enforcement of the
provisions of this section no doubt would not involve extra-
territorial constraint, but it would involve the exercise of
sovereign powers closely allied to the power of expulsion
and based on the same principles. The power of expulsion
is in truth but the complement of the power of exclusion.
If entry be prohibited it would seem to follow that the
Government which has the power to exclude should have
the power to expel the alien who enters in opposition to its
laws. In Hodge v. The Queen! it was decided that a colonial
legislature has within the limits prescribed by the statute
which created it ‘an authority as plenary and as ample . . .
as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power
possessed and could bestow’. If, therefore, power to expel
aliens who had entered Canada against the laws of the
Dominion was by this statute given to the Government of
the Dominion, as their Lordships think it was, it necessarily
follows that the statute has also given them power to impose
that extra-territorial constraint which is necessary to enable
them to expel those aliens from their borders to the same
extent as the Imperial Government could itself have imposed
the constraint for a similar purpose had the statute never
been passed.
Their Lordships therefore think that the decision of
Mr. Justice Anglin was wrong, and that the appeal should
be allowed, and will so humbly advise His Majesty.
Having regard to the arrangement as to costs made with
the Attorney-General at the hearing of the petition for
special leave to appeal, and to all the circumstances of the
case, their Lordships direct the appellant to pay thé costs
of the respondents as between solicitor and client.
It will be seen that the Privy Council in this case in no
wise derogate from the principle of the limits of the legis-
lation within the territorial jurisdiction. As a general rule,
what they do hold is in substance that the limitation must
not be insisted upon in such a manner as to render the grant
of legislative power ineffectual. That, it would seem, it is
only fair to concede. The case, therefore, does not carry us
beyond what is reasonably clear. A difficulty, however, is pre-
sented by this case in its relation to the case of Reg. v. Lesley.”
That case arose out of a revolution in South America.
© 9 App. Cas. 117. 2 (1860) 1 Bell C. C. 220;.29 L. J. M. C. 97.