Full text: Banking theories in the United States before 1860

216 BANKING THEORIES IN UNITED STATES 
United States Treasury,” urged Gouge. Nor should the banks 
complain, for they themselves benefit by the system of keeping 
the public money in special vaults. “If in their vaults, it would 
lead to new inflations; if in the public depositories, more or less of 
it will come to their aid in times of emergency.” ! Two secre- 
taries of the treasury in the next five years adopted Gouge’s view, 
and Howell Cobb urged that the states adopt independent trea- 
suries for this reason.” Cobb’s report also shows that the doctrine 
that the government should alleviate depressions and their at- 
tendant unemployment by increased expenditure on public 
works was not unknown. His attitude toward this, however, 
was quite different, for he dismissed it with a homily on the limi- 
tations of the proper functions of government, written in the best 
vein of an Adam Smith? Bowen, writing ten years after the re- 
establishment of the sub-treasury under Polk, criticized the sys- 
tem on the ground that its operations tended to disturb the 
money market by alternately withdrawing and restoring funds. 
In connection with the reserve situation at New York, the 
practice of paying interest on deposits, and in particular on the 
1 Gouge, ‘“ Special Report on the Public Depositories,” in Finance Report of the 
Secretary of the Treasury (Dec., 1854), p. 268. Edmund Dwight had said almost as 
much in 1851: “The Progressing Expansion,” Hunt's Merchants’ Magazine (Aug., 
1851), XXV, 149. 
® James Guthrie, Finance Report (Dec., 1856), p. 32; Howell Cobb, Finance 
Report (Dec., 1857), pp. 21 fi., and Finance Report (Dec., 1858), p. 16. Guthrie 
asserted: “The independent treasury, when over-trading takes place, gradually fills 
its vaults, withdraws the deposits, and, pressing the banks, the merchants and the 
dealers, exercises that temperate and timely control, which serves to secure the 
fortunes of individuals, and preserve the general prosperity.” Guthrie admitted, 
however, that it might tend to cause stringency in the money market when large 
surpluses of revenue were accumulating. 
3 Cobb, Finance Report (Dec., 1857), p. 12. 
! Bowen, Principles of Political Economy (1856), pp. 364, 365. For a lengthy 
discussion of the early influence of the independent treasury upon the banks and the 
money market, see Kinley, Independent Treasury of the United States, pp. 69-83, 
208-224. For the period since 1860, see ibid., pp. 225-281, and Sprague, History of 
Crises Under the National Banking System. 
The crisis of 1857 was probably aggravated by the accumulation of public funds 
by means of custom-house receipts in 1855, 1856, and 1857. The Bankers’ Magazine 
of March, 1857, spoke of this as taking place at a “fearful rate.” Later, as in 1853, 
the Secretary of the Treasury sought to relieve the stringency by purchasing bonds. 
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