One cannot study a form of state without taking into account its social 
contents. The social contents of Bolshevism are an attempt to manage — in 
following a single plan — uncombinable economics; to give privileges to the 
lower classes and particularly to a certain minority of the lower classes, thus 
entering into conflict with the usual hierarchic principle of society and the 
wishes of other lower classes; and to create products on the principle of 
consumption. I note only some of the deep antinomies of Bolshevism in 
its struggle against human organisation and human spirit. The result is a 
structure which contradicts the customs handed down to us by the past, and 
the healthy social tendencies which inevitably crop up; it is contrary to 
individual endeavours and to the principles of social structure. Every kind 
of State implies coercion, but at the same time is based on spiritual, 
economic and organising tendencies, independent of the State itself. 
Bolshevism denies these tendencies and therefore is obliged to use constant 
violence against them. Hence, dictatorship and violence "are not chance 
measures, not things that come and go, but the very essence of Bolshevism. 
The most softhearted and virtuous communist could not refuse to oppress 
political and economic liberty. Moreover, violence always tends to become 
more aggravated. When it goes too far and excess becomes a normal state, 
there is then no gradual way back. In other words: the GPU., as an organ 
of detection and execution, will always put its foot down whenever dicta- 
torship seems to weaken, for only when strained to the utmost can Bolshe- 
vism hold together its abnormal creation; push it, and it will crumble to 
pieces. Even incidental liberties are most threatening to the Soviet system, 
for they make it possible to prepare in its limits the elements of its own 
change. 
In all probability the Bolshevics themselves long to make the Soviet 
administrative apparatus more solid. But that also is impossible, for the 
Soviet apparatus must be weak, must be capable of action only inasmuch 
as it is penetrated by the communistic party. It must depend entirely on 
the communist rulers, though retaining the appearance of election from 
below; it must be managed not by competent, but by faithful persons; it 
must call its subordinates elected members. In a word — it must remain 
as it is. Bolshevism cannot permit the strengthening and the normalisation 
of the Soviet administration, for it would mean creating a rival force. The 
Soviet apparatus must be unable to function without the Communist Party. 
The party itself is defined by a certain creed and aim; it cannot hand 
over its problems to the masses, to elected gatherings, to free meetings. It 
must remain in the hold of its leaders, as regards the execution and distri- 
bution of function etc.; but, one of its articles of faith being the “rule of 
the proletariat”, it must have the organisation seem rising from the lower 
classes. Thus. even in its own limits, the party contains a contradiction 
LR