52 STATE INSURANCE AGAINST WAR RISKS AT SEA 
under which the State undertook the purchasing and bringing 
in of the essential imports and their distribution by means of 
fixed rations amongst the consumers, and in so far as the 
introduction of that policy was delayed by reason of the 
confidence inspired by the apparent ease with which commerce 
adapted itself to war conditions, the War Risk Insurance Scheme 
in great measure is responsible for the debt that was piled up 
by the nation in the vain attempt to maintain a peace standard 
of living. 
The confidence inspired by the Scheme also reacted disas- 
trously on the Admiralty. Before the end of 1914 it had been 
made manifest that the U-Boat was to be the chief weapon of 
the enemy in his attack on this country’s oversea supplies, and 
that he was prepared to sink unarmed as well as armed British 
merchant ships regardless of the usages of war, and without 
any concern as to the safety of those on board. Every act of 
the enemy emphasized the points that Germany was maintain- 
ing the right to resort, whenever it pleased, to an unrestricted 
submarine campaign as an answer to the blockade established 
by this country, and that the only factors that counted in 
determining the opening of that campaign were (1) its probable 
reaction on neutrals, and in particular on the United States, 
and (2) the possession of a sufficient number of submarines to 
make the campaign really effective. The peril was manifest 
from the beginning of February 1915, but beyond providing 
for the patrolling of the inshore lanes of traffic, and arming 
about one-fourth of the merchant ships, nothing had been 
foreseen, nothing had been provided for, when two years later 
the enemy opened his campaign of sinking at sight all vessels 
trading with this country. The Admiralty had not even taken 
the trouble to master the first elements of the problem—the 
number of sailings to be protected. The result was that we 
started our anti-submarine work twenty-four months late, 
and thereby we nearly lost the war. 
There are strong grounds for the belief that this delay 
resulted, in great measure, from the feeling of security created 
in the minds of both the Admiralty and the country by the