PRIZE COURTS AND THE LAW THEY ADMINISTER. 
contain many valuable principles which were 
used by the English judges in moulding the law 
and practice of the Admiralty Court. It is note- 
worthy that Sir Julius Caesar, speaking in the 
sixteenth century, referred to maritime law as 
being the ‘truest and most indifferent judge 
between all nations,” ® whilst Lord Mansfield, 
nearly two hundred years afterwards, still held 
that ‘“ all the world were parties to a sentence of 
a Court of Admiralty.”” ® Maritime law was thus 
considered to be of universal obligation, not 
because it was prescribed by any single State, but 
because it rested on the common consent of all 
civilised communities. 
From the British point of view, the true reason 
why prize jurisdiction is appropriate to the 
Admiralty Court is that prizes are acquisitions jure 
belli and that the law of war, just as that of the 
sea, must be governed by international law. This 
principle was admirably expressed by Sir Charles 
Hedges in 1689 :—The Court of Admiralty is a 
Court of Justice, and the judge who is sworn to 
administer it is as much obliged to observe the laws 
of nations as the judges of the Courts of West- 
minster are bound to proceed according to the 
statutes and the common law.” And in the leading 
case of Le Caux v. Eden, Buller, J., also stated 
that jus belli is to be determined by the law of 
5 Add. MSS. 12505, fol, 877. 
® Bernardi v. Motteux (1781), 2 Dougl. 575; 581. And Luke v. 
Lyde (1759), 2 Burrow, 883, 887. 
7 8. P. Dom. Naval, 1, October 22, 1689, in R. G. Marsden, 
poen relating to the law and custom of the sea (1915), Vol. 2, 
5