250 The Stock Market Crash—And After 
ures showing the progress of total loans obtained for 
the purpose of carrying securities for distribution, 
together with the general conditions which prevail in 
the money market. 
Most of the preceding suggestions are evidently 
based on the idea that safety standards should be set 
up as to loans in relation to stock prices, earnings 
and all other pertinent facts, just as standards have 
been set up as to lines of credit extended by banks 
to corporations as related to quick assets and liabil- 
ities. This project is a highly technical one which 
bankers and brokers should grapple with until, as 
Mr. Lounsdale said, the brokers’ loans should mark 
a “scientific” figure. 
Rediscount for Brokers’ Loans 
[ would add this further proposal, that if the 
Federal Reserve Banks were authorized to redis- 
count brokers’ loans, the influence of the Federal 
Reserve System, Federal Banks and Federal Reserve 
Board would be more easily exerted upon the mem- 
ber banks and less easily evaded. As it is now, a 
member bank, while it cannot rediscount a broker's 
loan, can rediscount other paper to take its place, 
and by indirection can really evade the law which 
now attempts to prevent the rediscount of loans with 
collateral security. If the rediscount of brokers’ 
loans were permitted the banker would be far more 
likely to lay his cards on the table instead of attempt- 
ing any evasion; he would become more subject to