THE BASIS OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 3
to those rules and regulations, it could not expect to be considered as a mem-
ber of the Family of Nations; and that any State that should commit a
breach of this obligation in respect of foreign subjects within its territorial
bounds would be held responsible and accountable for redress. Couched in
these terms, the Geneva Preparatory Committee of the Codification Con-
ference has propounded the question of the legal foundation of State respon-
sibility in the Bases of Discussion submitted to the various governments.
The Government of Germany replied that it held the view of the binding
force of International Law, and that the general importance of this problem
surpasses that of mere responsibility and extends beyond its scope. The
Danish Government deems that it is not essential to base the responsibility
of States on a purely formal conception. Both the latter and the Swiss
governments do not deem it proper to advance international common assent
as the reason for responsibility. The Danish Government further avers that
it would be difficult to conceive that just because a State does not recognize
its responsibility under international law, it should thereby be deprived of
its rights to be considered as a member of the Family of Nations. The
Swiss Government maintains that it would be a source of confusion to
establish too close an occasional relationship between international common
assent and responsibility.
[t is practically impossible to eliminate altogether purely formal con-
ceptions in this issue. The essential principles of responsibility can not very
well be severed from their foundation upon the binding force of the law of
Nations, inasmuch as responsibility itself “constitutes merely one feature of
the general principles of the law.” The settlement of all special cases of
responsibility involves the idea of adherence to juridical precedents. The
general doctrines implicitly embody the sense of practical solutions. How-
ever, whenever the ancient notion of absolute sovereignty is invoked, respon-
sibility is thereby avoided. The Roumanian Government has advanced this
doctrine in its reply to the Preparatory Committee of the Codification Con-
ference. When the doctrine of self-limitation is invoked, responsibility finds
its basis upon principles strictly subject to established conventions. How-
ever, if the responsibility of States is founded upon the broader doctrine of
common right, new fields are thereby laid open for its application. This
suggests the advisability of establishing some presumption of law, which
should insinuate or justify the handling of matters incident to membership
in the Family of Nations. There is a series of issues more or less related
to the solution of the fundamental juridical problems, to wit: the rights of
aliens; supremacy of municipal or international law, etc. The sanction of
jurisdiction, especially in legal matters, depends to a certain extent upon the
view adopted for the foundation of responsibility as a feature of the general
theory of the law.