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MEDIATE AND IMMEDIATE STATE RESPONSIBILITY
(a) The cases of responsibility arising out of the acts or omissions of
governmental organs and public officials are, of course, the most numerous
in international jurisprudence. There are considerable differences in the
practices of the various governments and in the decisions of the arbitrators
and mixed claims commissions. It would be well to consider: first, cases
involving responsibility for acts of competent officials who have discharged
their duties in pursuance of the law; or have exceded their authority; or in
any way infringed the provisions of the municipal law to the detriment of
alien subjects; second, acts which are not within the scope of official duty,
but personal acts which involve, therefore, merely personal responsibility of
the officer under the municipal law; third, cases of the same nature as the
last mentioned ones, but which, by their characteristics or apparent relation-
ship to the functions of public office, may be similar, under certain circum-
stances, to public acts proper; fourth, cases in which there is no bad faith
on the part of the government officials, or in respect of which the national
authorities have adopted proper measures, and the State is thus relieved of
all responsibility ; and fifth, finally, all cases of common responsibility which
assume international character through the fault of the State or denial of
administrative justice.
(b) Responsibility might also arise directly between two States. These
cases come up, for instance, in territorial encroachments; or violation of
treaty provisions; or disregard for the rights of a neutral State; or lack
of due respect to diplomatic organs; and, generally speaking, in all cases in
which the injury has not been inflicted upon individuals, but upon the foreign
community as an entity, or in its national character as a member of the
Family of Nations. International jurisprudence has, indeed, numerous
cases involving this type of responsibility, which is termed “immediate
responsibility”, because the facts upon which it is based establish, at the
onset, a question between two powers. A distinction has to be drawn, how-
ever, between immediate and objective responsibility. It does not arise out
of all injurious acts. There are instances in international procedure in