cHAP. Iv] THE PREROGATIVE OF MERCY 1391 
minister in this Colony hitherto been in the same position 
as the Home Secretary in England. He has neither exercised 
the function of pardon, nor, as a rule, been asked for advice. 
Except in rare cases, and then only in a limited degree, when 
special features or new facts have presented themselves, he 
has never actively interfered. What would be his position, 
if he entered upon a system of partial advice, and accepted 
in matters of the gravest moment a secondary or limited 
authority, irreconcilable with the nature of his duties and 
responsibilities as a minister under parliamentary govern- 
ment ? 
Lord Granville says, ¢ the Governor would be bound to 
allow great weight to the recommendation of his Ministry.’ 
The Circular of November 1, 1871, says, ‘ he will, of course, 
pay due regard to the advice of his ministers.’ Lord 
Kimberley, in his dispatch of February 17. 1873. repeats 
the words of Lord Granville. 
It cannot be doubted that the advice here intended is 
wholly distinct in its nature from the advice given in the 
general conduct of affairs. In the general case the advice 
is uniformly accepted, as the first condition of the adviser 
continuing to hold office. In all his acts the minister's 
responsibility to Parliament is simple, undivided, and direct. 
But in pardoning convicted offenders, the Governor, although 
he is to ‘ pay due regard to the advice of his ministers ’, is at 
the same time informed by the Secretary of State that he 
‘is bound to examine personally each case in which he is 
called upon to exercise the power entrusted to him’, and 
that with him rests the responsibility. The exceptional 
advice implied seems to be of the nature of opinions or 
suggestions, to which weight may be attached as coming 
from persons ‘responsible to the Colony for the proper 
administration of justice and the prevention of crime’, but 
which in any case, or in every case, may be partially or 
wholly disregarded. 
It does not appear to be clear that the Governor is required 
by the Secretary of State to seek even this secondary class 
of advice in all cases. It would rather seem that the instruc- 
tion does not necessarily extend beyond cases in which 
pardons are proposed to be granted, in which cases the 
minister would simply have to concur in a decision already 
formed, or be placed in the somewhat invidious position of 
objecting to the extension of mercy. This view would shut 
out from the minister’s limited power of advice the numerous 
cages in which much concern is frequently felt by portions 
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