CHAP, V] TREATY RELATIONS 1123
It is very possible, however, that the Dominion Govern-
ment could adhere even when it had no specific legislative
power,! and by adherence obtain such power, and the
objection that the Dominion Government would thus be
enabled to override a Provincial Parliament within its own
sphere of activity would seem to be met adequately by the
reply that a treaty can only be made by the Imperial Govern-
ment, and that if the Imperial Government and the Dominion
Government consider adherence desirable, the circumstances
cannot be such as to justify a Provincial Government in
declining to adhere. The position, therefore, is :—
(1) that adherence must be declared for the Dominion as
a whole ;
(2) such adherence is constitutionally declared at the
request of the Dominion Government alone, and
(3) under constitutional practice the Dominion Govern-
ment in cases where the Dominion Parliament has no direct
legislative power, will not normally adhere except with the
consent of all the Provincial Governments, but
(4) it is probable in law that the Dominion Government
could adhere in any case and by adherence obtain power to
legislate.
In any case it is clear that it would rest with the Dominion
Government to secure that the Provincial Governments
observed treaty arrangements in which the Dominion Govern-
ment had concurred, or which were otherwise binding.
The matter was considered in the Canadian Parliament
on May 14, 19092 in connexion with the treaty with the
United States as regards waterways, and Mr. Borden quoted
8. 132 of the British North America Act, adding that he did
not know that any exact construction had ever been put upon
* Cf. the question of white phosphorus; a Bill was introduced by
Mr. Mackenzie King into the Dominion Parliament in 1911, and one
objection to it was on grounds of jurisdiction, as it is desired to prohibit
manufacture and sale as well as importation, in order to join the inter-
national convention as to it; see Debates, January 19. But the power
Seems to be given, if not by s. 132, by s. 91 (2), which allows legislation as
to trade and commerce, and the case seems to fall within the conception of
that term contemplated by the Privy Council. * Debates, pp. 6644 seq.
