118

142^-143),  whilst  he  might  have  had  to  pay
90  for  Cordoba  Second  Preference  (quoted
88-90),  what  would  his  position  have  been  in
March,  1907  ?  Why,  he  would  then  have
found  that  the  Buenos  Ayres  &  Pacific  Stock
had  in  the  meantime  not  only  dropped  in
value,  but  had  also  lost  its  free  market,  and  he
would  have  to  accept  119  for,  or  in  other
words  he  would  have  lost  £24  on,  every  £100
of  stock  which  he  held.  Whilst  Cordoba
Central  Second  Preference,  which  had  also
receded  in  the  meantime,  and  still  remained
a  wide-priced  stock,  were  yet  saleable  at  86
(quotation  86-88)  representing  a  loss  of  £4
only  on  every  £100  of  stock  held.
It  is  true  that  in  the  purchase  of  the
Buenos  Ayres  &  Pacific  Stock  only  10s.  more
than  the  lowest  price  quoted  at  the  time  was
paid,  while  the  market  turn  in  the  Cordoba
case  amounted  to  £2,  yet  not  all  this  disadvantage ­
  in  dealing  was  repeated  at  the  time  of  sale.
Thus  nominally  about  £2  was  saved  on  the
Buenos  Ayres  &  Pacific  transaction.  But  into
what  utter  insignificance  these  forty  shillings
sink  when  it  is  considered  that  the  cheaply
completed  transaction  produced  an  ultimate
loss  of  £24  against  a  loss  of  £4  only  on
the  same  quantity  of  the  less  negotiable
security.