SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 61 
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If it is formulated in terms of a narrative, it is usually 
an interpretation of occurrences in terms of volition and 
motives, either personal or collective. In that case the 
epistemological inquiry will be mainly an inquiry into the 
psychological presuppositions. If it is formulated in terms 
of historical laws, it is usually an interpretation in terms of 
an inherent dialectic of social institutions and sociological 
structures. In that case these structures and institutions 
are conceived as purely factual potencies. They are sup- 
posed to change their forms independently of the conscious 
volition of their actual bearers. These may stimulate or 
retard the movement, but they cannot prevent it or bring 
it about. The explanatory causes are then assumed to lie, 
not in the volition of individuals, but in the inherent logic 
of these forms and institutions, which expresses itself with 
mechanical necessity. Here motive and volition, either per- 
sonal or collective, are left outside of the interpretation, 
and the epistemological inquiry will therefore be mainly 
concerned with the a priori categories which make possible 
a reading of historical laws into successive historical phe- 
nomena. Most histories use both forms of interpretation, 
and the epistemological inquiry into their underlying as- 
sumptions will therefore deal with both types of presuppo- 
sitions.! 
The metaphysics of history is directed, on the one hand, 
toward the completion of knowledge and, on the other 
hand, toward the valuation of its content. It asks whether 
the stages of social evolution are analogous to the stages 
of cosmic evolution in a way which suggests a single for- 
mula. But, apart from existential judgments, it also asks 
for value judgments. It questions whether each single his- 
torical fact and occurrence has a value in and for itself or 
only in relation to the whole historical movement. It asks 
L Probl. der Gesch., chap. i, pp. 1-74.