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      <titleStmt>
        <title>War borrowing</title>
        <author>
          <persName>
            <forname>Jacob H.</forname>
            <surname>Hollander</surname>
          </persName>
        </author>
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          <msIdentifier>
            <idno>101124439X</idno>
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      <div>THE PAST 
21 
never end.” In economic effect, their service as 
currency “ expanded prices, and increased the spec 
ulation and extravagance always incident to 
war.” 24 
There remain the authorization of 1898 and the 
emission of 1907. Of these the issue of 1907 was 
again monetary rather than fiscal in character — a 
consequence less of a depleted treasury than of a 
rigid bond secured circulation, whereby an acutely 
strained credit market sought relief in otherwise 
unnecessary debt creation. Only in the Spanish- 
American War authorization of 1898 did the 
Treasury contemplate a short time negotiable obli 
gation in the manner familiar to fiscal practice and 
sanctioned by fiscal theory — anticipation of the 
proceeds of a funded loan designed to meet extra 
ordinary expenditures. 
24 Dewey, “ Financial History of the United States,” p. 317.</div>
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