102 WAR BORROWING terval of new certificate issues, the Treasury might at any and all times have prevented or at least quickly corrected an over-full balance. We may assume a certain reluctance on the part of depositary banks to suffer a net reduction of government deposits, ­ when in the course of public expenditure such deposits were drawn upon. But with the rediscount ­ facilities of the Federal Reserve System making ­ it possible for the depositary banks to increase their available funds under such circumstances with little effort and at moderate cost, it seems unlikely that the Treasury would have given consideration to pressure from this quarter whether presented in the interest of monetary ease or of some related reason. Until such time, however, as the purpose of the Treasury shall have been fully set forth, it seems idle to speculate as to motive. The essential fact is that to the extent that the working balance was built up or maintained at a higher level than safe financing ­ necessitated, the maximum economy of certificate ­ borrowing was unrealized. There remain to be considered the advantages of certificate borrowing as a continuing mode of war financing. Over and above its effectiveness or otherwise in meeting immediate fiscal necessities, in how far may a policy of anticipatory borrowing be regarded as rendering easier or more difficult the prospective financial requirement? Having to do with a war of highly uncertain duration and of rapidly progressive cost, it is quite conceivable that a present fiscal advantage may be gained only at excessive ­ cost with respect to future needs. Theoretical analysis suggests that there are two