76 III.—CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES. made to the remuneration of the employees by the bonus on wages which they have received is shown in the Table below: —• Ratio of Bonus to Wages in Profit-sharing Retail Distributive (Store) Societies, 1899-1910. [Compiled from. Returns made to the Co-operative Union, to the Labour Department, and to the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies.] Year. No. of Profit-sharing Employees at end of year. Patio of Bonus to Wages and Salaries. Distributive Departments. Productive Departments. Total. Distribu tive De partments Productive Depart ments. Both De partments together. 1899 12,101 1,075 13,176 Per cent. 6-1 Per cent. 6'7 Per cent. 6-2 1900 # # 12,018 * # 5-2 1901 10,282 1,903 12,185 5’3 4-9 5-3 1902 11,110 1,931 13,041 5-4 5-3 5-3 1903 11,756 2,314 14,070 5-4 5-0 5-4 1904 12,771 2,448 15,219 5-5 5-2 5-4 1905 14,132 2,465 16,597 5-3 5-1 5-2 1906 14,680 2,738 17,418 5-1 5-0 5-1 1907 15,006 2,736 17,742 5-1 5-1 5-1 1908 14,017 2,905 16,922 5-0 4-9 5-0 1909 13,958 2,792 16,750 4-6 4-6 4-6 1910 14,411 2,829 17,240 4-5 4-6 4-5 Note.—A Society is not included in the Tabic for any year in which it did not allot a sum to employees. * Cannot be stated. It will be seen that the ratio of bonus to wages in the distri butive and productive departments of these Societies respectively has varied but slightly during the twelve years covered by the Table, having during the greater part of this period been a little over 5 per cent., though it has fallen below this figure in the last two years. Shareholding by Employees. The membership of Retail Distributive Societies, as of Co operative Societies of every type, is invariably open, subject to election by the Committee of Management, so that there is no difficulty in the employees becoming shareholders, and it is believed that in most cases they do so. In regard to the extent of the control capable of being exercised by the employees at meetings of the shareholders, it must be borne in mind that the rule in these Societies is one member one vote, irrespective of the number of shares held by each. As to their direct influence upon the pro ceedings of the Committee of Management, it may be stated that it is very unlikely that in any appreciable number of cases em