﻿76

III.—CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES.

made to the remuneration of the employees by the bonus on wages
which they have received is shown in the Table below: —•

Ratio of Bonus to Wages in Profit-sharing Retail
Distributive (Store) Societies, 1899-1910.

[Compiled from. Returns made to the Co-operative Union, to the Labour Department,
and to the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies.]

Year.	No. of Profit-sharing Employees at end of year.			Patio of Bonus to Wages and Salaries.		
	Distributive  Departments.	Productive  Departments.	Total.	Distribu- tive De- partments	Productive  Depart-  ments.	Both De- partments together.
1899	12,101	1,075	13,176	Per cent. 6-1	Per cent. 6'7	Per cent. 6-2
1900	#	#	12,018	*	#	5-2
1901	10,282	1,903	12,185	5’3	4-9	5-3
1902	11,110	1,931	13,041	5-4	5-3	5-3
1903	11,756	2,314	14,070	5-4	5-0	5-4
1904	12,771	2,448	15,219	5-5	5-2	5-4
1905	14,132	2,465	16,597	5-3	5-1	5-2
1906	14,680	2,738	17,418	5-1	5-0	5-1
1907	15,006	2,736	17,742	5-1	5-1	5-1
1908	14,017	2,905	16,922	5-0	4-9	5-0
1909	13,958	2,792	16,750	4-6	4-6	4-6
1910	14,411	2,829	17,240	4-5	4-6	4-5

Note.—A Society is not included in the Tabic for any year in which it did not allot a
sum to employees.

* Cannot be stated.

It will be seen that the ratio of bonus to wages in the distri-
butive and productive departments of these Societies respectively
has varied but slightly during the twelve years covered by the
Table, having during the greater part of this period been a little
over 5 per cent., though it has fallen below this figure in the last
two years.

Shareholding by Employees.

The membership of Retail Distributive Societies, as of Co-
operative Societies of every type, is invariably open, subject to
election by the Committee of Management, so that there is no
difficulty in the employees becoming shareholders, and it is believed
that in most cases they do so. In regard to the extent of the
control capable of being exercised by the employees at meetings
of the shareholders, it must be borne in mind that the rule in these
Societies is one member one vote, irrespective of the number of
shares held by each. As to their direct influence upon the pro-
ceedings of the Committee of Management, it may be stated that
it is very unlikely that in any appreciable number of cases em-