<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0">
  <teiHeader>
    <fileDesc>
      <titleStmt>
        <title>The nature of capital and income</title>
        <author>
          <persName>
            <forname>Irving</forname>
            <surname>Fisher</surname>
          </persName>
        </author>
      </titleStmt>
      <publicationStmt />
      <sourceDesc>
        <bibl>
          <msIdentifier>
            <idno>102659555X</idno>
          </msIdentifier>
        </bibl>
      </sourceDesc>
    </fileDesc>
  </teiHeader>
  <text>
    <body>
      <div>Sec. 3] PROPERTY 21 
the broader definition of wealth, which includes human 
beings even when free, and by adopting also a coextensively 
broad definition of property so as to include all rights known 
to jurisprudence. This being premised, it follows that 
every right is a property right. No rights have ever been 
suggested which are not rights to obtain and enjoy the 
uses of wealth, either persons or things. Even the “right 
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” is simply 
one’s right to certain uses of his own person. The rights 
of a husband over his wife and of a wife over her husband, 
and the reciprocal rights between parents and children, as 
well as all other rights in personam, are claims against par- 
ticular persons; while the right to reputation, to the free 
exercise of one’s calling, to immunity from boycott, perse- 
cution, etc., are claims upon the community generally. 
These rights are not ordinarily called property rights, just 
as persons are not ordinarily called wealth, and for a similar 
reason, — they do not enter into trade. When wives 
were bought and sold they were regarded as wealth, and 
marital rights as property. To-day, both are taken out of 
commerce and therefore removed from commercial ideas 
and terms. The economist need not, perhaps, absolutely 
insist on restoring them ; like the business man, he is chiefly 
interested in what is salable. But in framing his defini- 
tions he finds it difficult, if not impossible, to confine the 
terms “wealth” and “property” to objects which are ex- 
changeable, without thereby sacrificing simplicity and logi- 
cal convenience, and excluding certain objects, such as public 
parks and former English entails, which, though never sold, 
even business men would call wealth and property respec- 
tively. We therefore choose in this book to frame our defi- 
nitions so as to include such elements, even though they be 
not further referred to. In definitions, it is usually better 
to include too much rather than too little,and in this case, 
1 Cf. T. E. Holland, Jurisprudence, Macmillan, 1898, pp. 50, 80, 87, 
00, 128.</div>
    </body>
  </text>
</TEI>
