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        <title>Proceedings of the South &amp; East African combined agricultural, cotton, entomological and mycological conference held at Nairobi, August, 1926</title>
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      <div>PART TT. 
sufficiently great to nullify completely all effort to keep prices up, 
and in the event even bring them down to a level lower than 
actual production cost. 
Production monopolists in general therefore can only 
arbitrarily force the price of their commodity which is so essential 
to the life of the community that it is beyond the power of the 
consumer to modify the demand. Furthermore, the position of 
the Brazilian Coffee producers in particular is rendered more 
precarious by the existence of many other sources—potential as 
well as in no inappreciable measure actual from which coffee may 
be obtained. 
This means that if the Brazilians continue their policy of 
forcing enhanced costs on to the consumers, those consumers will 
be all the more ready to resort in self-defence to retaliatory tactics 
on the lines indicated above. For if they find that the coffee they 
require can only be obtained from Brazil at a very inflated price, 
they will turn their attention to other countries where coffee can 
be grown which will undersell Brazilian and yet leave producers’ 
profits satisfactorily high. 
Such a position of affairs is well within the bounds of 
possibility, and would undoubtedly awaken an increased interest 
in the coffee markets of the Hast. Satisfactory prices on a 
consistently remunerative level would be ensured, for the 
Brazilian  producers—owing to the cost of combating 
Stephanoderes—are no longer in a position temporarily to cut 
their prices down to a level below that at which their competitors 
can profitably produce. Indeed the boot would be on the other 
foot; for it would appear that a price is quite practicable which 
would give a satisfactory profit to countries untroubled by 
Stephanoderes while entailing a loss for producers involved in 
an Anti-Stephanoderes campaign. 
It is an ill wind which blows nobody good, and it would appear 
from the statement I have quoted that the misfortunes of the 
Brazilians from the ravages of Stephanoderes is going to open up new 
markets for coffee growers outside that country. 
The Brazilians will no doubt do their utmost to maintain their 
position and might very likely be successful along the lines the Java 
authorities adopted, under similar stress of introducing the parasite of 
the Stephanoderes. In the meantime other coffee producing countries 
have an opportunity of gaining an entrance into the markets. 
RoBUSTA AS A CROP FOR UGANDA. 
I should like now to say something with respect to Robusta as a 
suitable crop for Uganda. I have already observed that Robusta has 
a wide distribution as an indigenous plant within our borders and 
adjoining territories, and I think we may claim with a great deal of 
justification, Uganda as the home of Robusta. It was grown by the 
natives long before the advent of the European in Central Africa so 
that we are not dealing with a plant in an experimental stage. But 
apart, however, from its suitability in that respect and its resistance 
to the major pests which attack arabica in the country, it is a plant 
admirably adopted to native cultivation. I have argued before now 
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