

doing his utmost to compete, by more scientific working, with larger output per pit and reduced overhead and underground charges. It is hardly to be expected, however, that any expansion of local consumption in Yorkshire will continue in a ratio equal to the enlarging capacity of supply. The only possible outlet for increased production in the Yorkshire coalfields is increased facility of export, and in that direction the door is by no means closed.

It must be borne in mind that trade union demands and consequent disputes have always played a prominent part in the coal industry, resulting frequently in stoppage of work, costing the miner large sums in loss of wages, besides depriving the coal-owner of his income and raising against him his overhead charges, which have to be borne whether his pit is at work or not. These intermittent labour disturbances have been accompanied or followed by both legislative and departmental interference with the course of mining operations. In Appendices will be found a record of the number and duration of strikes and wages agreements between the years 1868 and 1926, with a statement of the chief mining disputes between 1890 and 1926, the number of men affected, and the aggregate number of days lost through these contentions. It is hardly going too far to say that if during the time of idleness full wages had been earned, and handed, instead of being totally lost, to the Miners' Federation, that body could have bought as many shares in colliery companies as would have secured to it the virtual control of the coal industry of the United Kingdom.

How other industries have suffered through the closing of coal pits may be realised to some extent by the amount of fuel they require for their operation. The engineering trade utilised in 1925 some 2,000,000 tons of iron and steel, consuming in their application 2,000,000 tons of coal for power generation. These 2,000,000 tons of iron and steel involved a consumption of at least 6,500,000 tons of coal