THE MONETARY CRISIS 49 the national monetary unit to depreciate to an unlimited extent in relation to gold. A loss on exchange did not, however, occur everywhere at once. In France, for in- stance, the exchange remained normal during the first months of the war, and the franc for a short time even went slightly to a premium. This is explained by the fact that France was repatriating capital during this initial stage and had no debit balance to meet abroad. Nevertheless, the inconvertibility of notes and the pro- hibition to export gold formed the starting point of the exchange crisis, since unlimited dealings in foreign cur- rencies could thenceforward take place at a rate below par; thus the slightest deficit requiring settlement was bound to provoke it. And so after November 1914 the mark lost 109, on New York market, and had fallen by 20 or 259, in the first quarter of 1916. During the same period the value of the mark had depreciated by 24 to 35% at Amsterdam, and the Austrian crown by more than 409, at Geneva. Again, the Russian exchange had fallen in 1915 by 18 to 339, even on the Paris market. The Italian lira had lost about 89, in Paris, 189, in Switzerland and 309%, in the United States. The French franc, which, as has just been observed, had withstood the effects of forced currency for some months, came to be quoted in 1916 at 12 or even 149%, discount in London, 16%, in New York and Geneva, and 259%, in Amsterdam. As we shall see later, arrangements were made between the Allies in order to establish with the help of certain neutrals a united front on the exchange market, and thus prevent excessive depreciation of the currencies of countries most directly implicated in the war by shifting part of the burden on to the others; hence, the United States having also temporarily suspended the free export of gold,! the dollar was quoted at a loss in certain neutral markets.2 1 Gold was exported in spite of the prohibition, in the form of contra- band, but at a very heavy price. See Tetrode, “La Banque néerlandaise pendant la guerre,” Rev. d’ec. polit., November 1920, p. 675. 2 It should be observed that the depreciation of the dollar in relation to EF