THE MONETARY CRISIS 57 to the Swiss franc fixed on Berlin differed considerably, however, from those which prevailed on the free market at Amsterdam or Geneva, where bills on Germany drawn in marks were paid for in florins and Swiss francs respec- tively, and, in view of the monopoly of the Foreign Exchange Office, arbitraging could not come into play in order to bring the rates to level time. With the object, therefore, of creating a single rate for the mark at the level desired by the Office, German exporters were urged not to allow their foreign clients to discharge debts by purchasing and transmitting bills on Germany drawn in marks, but rather themselves to draw bills on their clients in foreign currencies, which would be negotiated at Berlin. This method was all the more justifiable in that neutral exporters usually required German importers to settle in neutral currencies and rarely negotiated bills drawn in marks. The creation of the Foreign Exchange Office had in any case the advantage of giving German importers, who had contracted to pay in foreign currencies, the means of obtaining these currencies at a comparatively stable rate, leaving the exchange risks on the neutral market to be borne by foreign dealers who covered the bills drawn in marks. The Office may further be considered to have contributed to supporting the rate, even abroad, since the mark will be seen to have remained fairly stable on foreign markets after the Office was created and up to about the end of 1916. But the centralisation of foreign payments could no longer send up or even maintain the rate of exchange when the available funds thus collected ceased to be sufficient for requirements. ยง 4. Aggravation of the Exchange Crisis after the War. Contrary to the hopes which were formed at the Armistice, when all the exchanges including the mark, the Austrian crown and the rouble had improved, the cessation of hostilities was not to put an end to the ex- change crisis. It is true that the dollar was soon back at