THE MONETARY CRISIS 31 mark is no doubt partly to be explained by a lack of initiative or power in the Banking Office, and by the economic and technical conditions as a whole. When the proceeds of the small American loan were exhausted in 1919, the United States, alarmed by the social policy of Czechoslovakia, which they believed to have fallen under the influence of the Bolshevists, stopped all credits. The Germans thereupon undertook to support the Czech exchange either by opening mark credits or by accepting payments in Czech crowns. In the event, Czechoslovakia succeeded, not only in paying for its purchases in Germany in marks, but also in accepting marks in payment for its deliveries in Germany. Thus on all sides the connection between the two exchanges was confirmed.! On the whole, dealings in Czech crowns were confined to Vienna, Prague and Berlin, and the Prague exchange could never obtain an ascendancy over its rivals at short notice. In particular, the Vienna exchange, which was better equipped, con- tinued to be the chief foreign exchange market in Central Europe ; for Western dealers continued to settle chiefly through Vienna or Berlin, and even the Zurich exchange felt this influence. This interdependence, however, of the rate of the Czech crown on the one hand and the rates of the mark and the Austrian crown on the other, lasting as it did for two years, the issue of the former being strictly limited 2 and the latter being subject to continual i»flation, none the less contradicts the theory on which Rasin based his plan and which is still held by so many economists. Moreover, in spite of currency contraction, domestic prices in Czechoslovakia rose steadily. The rise, which was at first moderated in the case of certain com.- modities in 1919 by a conjunction of favourable circum- !8ee A. Rasin, 0p. cit., p. 73. The author also shows that the Czech importers preferred paying for German imports in marks because they feared a disagio on the crown, and explains, on the other hand, why the Czech exporters desired the Czech crown to fall with the mark in order to have the benefit of a continually increasing premium on the exchange. ® It may be added that, in spite of a social programme involving a con- siderable burden, the 1921 Budget was almost balanced. (Piot, p. 189.) [a