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        <title>Banking theories in the United States before 1860</title>
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            <forname>Harry Edward</forname>
            <surname>Miller</surname>
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            <idno>1755492553</idno>
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      <div>104 BANKING THEORIES IN UNITED STATES 
The leading arguments for a national bank (passing over the 
claim that it would aid the fiscal operations of the government) 
were that it would provide a sound and uniform currency, exert 
a restraining influence on state banks, and reduce the cost of 
domestic exchange.’ 
Hildreth, who doted on applying laissez-faire doctrines to 
banking, believed free competition was the solvent of all our 
troubles. The supervisory influence of a national bank was hardly 
necessary or likely to be helpful. “You set up a National Bank 
to watch the other banks; but who is to watch the watcher?” he 
asked? Tucker sought to dispose of the objection that the na- 
tional bank itself might not pursue a desirable policy by urging 
the establishment of two or three such banks. Competition would 
then be furnished on this higher level of our banking hierarchy, 
and the power of each national bank to do evil would be dimin- 
ished.? To this Charles Francis Adams justly objected that the 
ability of any one of the banks to have a beneficial influence would 
be proportionately lessened. 
“Tt is the right of the people,” was the interesting suggestion 
of an obscure essayist of 1834, “under such restrictions as the 
wisdom of Congress may deem necessary, to furnish a sound 
federal currency; and the constitution confers upon the govern- 
ment no power to confine this privilege to a single corporation, 
to the exclusion of the great body of the people. We are, there- 
fore, if possible, for abolishing all monopoly, and for substituting 
in the place of a National Bank a National System of Banking.” 8 
Smaller banks, with a capital of less than two million dollars, he 
was content to retain under state laws; but banks with capital of 
1 E. g., see Raguet, Examiner (1834), ii, 141; Tucker, Theory, etc. (1839), PP- 
274-279. 
4 To ireth, History of Banking (1837), p- 138. H. C. Carey also invoked the 
laissez-faire doctrine in opposing a national bank for the purpose of regulating other 
banks. Past, Present, and Future (1848), pp. 179, 180; and Letter to the President 
(Dec. 25, 1857), p- 15. 
3 Tucker, Theory (1839), pp. 328-330; ‘‘ Banks or No Banks,” Hunt's Merchants’ 
Magazine (Feb., 1858), xxxviii, 155, 156. 
4 C. F. Adams, “Theory of Money and Banks,” Hunt's M erchants’ Magazine 
(Aug., 1839), i, 122. 
5 W. R. Collier. Essay on the Currency (1834), p. 8.</div>
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