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        <title>Banking theories in the United States before 1860</title>
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            <forname>Harry Edward</forname>
            <surname>Miller</surname>
          </persName>
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            <idno>1755492553</idno>
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      <div>BANKING POLICY 
[77 
practice of some banks to confine their discounts exclusively to business 
paper, or paper that is subject to no renewal, is a great innovation, and 
denies to a worthy class of borrowers those facilities and advantages to which 
they are entitled in common with those of more various and extended busi- 
ness. It cannot be doubted that there is a class of borrowers of limited busi- 
ness whose requests for bank favors are small and infrequent, and for whom 
some accommodation, by way of renewal, is proper.! 
The Massachusetts commissioners in 1839 also cautioned the 
banks against excessive refusal of accommodation loans. 
A few writers advanced a very significant criticism of the doc- 
trine that bank credit could have no harmful effect if issued only 
in response to the demands of commerce as evidenced by the offer 
of real paper for discount. Raguet, in a remarkable analysis of 
the causes of commercial crises, pointed out that a liberal loan 
policy, leading to rising prices, stimulates trade activity. A 
sellers’ market results, and “purchases are made for no other 
reason, than that the buyers suppose they can sell the next day 
at a profit.” Transfers of goods for speculative purpose become 
numerous. ‘Every new sale of commodities and property on 
credit creates new promissory notes, and these create a new de- 
mand for discounts.” And so the cycle goes cumulatively on, 
until bank reserves become too slight and the inevitable check 
upon expanding credit brings disaster.? 
C. F. Adams gave essentially the same explanation in discuss- 
ing the crisis of 1837. Expanding note issues enhance prices and, 
therefore, profits rise. Business activity increases, and the rising 
prices, taken together with more frequent transfers of the same 
article, occasion a larger volume of real paper, the discount of 
which renews the process.* And Gouge, who later modified his 
original hostility toward banks and practically accepted the doc- 
trine that no evil would result if discounting were but confined to 
real paper, retained sufficient of his earlier bias to protest that he 
would still prefer to dispense with credit banks altogether. Just 
as trade could not be disturbed if carried on by barter of commod- 
' Connecticut, Report of Bank Commissioners (1841), in U. S. House of Repre- 
sentatives, 29th Congress, 1st Session, Document 226, p. 210. 
* Raguet, “Principles of Banking,” Free Trade Advocate (1829), ii, 7. Raguet 
gave a similar account in Currency and Banking (18309), pp. 134-137. 
8 C. F. Adams, Reflections, etc. (1837), pp. 9-12.</div>
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