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        <title>International trade</title>
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            <forname>Frank William</forname>
            <surname>Taussig</surname>
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            <idno>1758394757</idno>
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      <div>CHANGES IN VOLUME OF PAPER MONEY 391 
the decline of transactions with foreign countries as well as within 
the country, breakdown all around. This is what took place in 
Germany when the issues of paper money, at first comparatively 
moderate, reached the farcical dimensions of 1923. The export 
bounty and the exchange dumping came to a speedy end. Quite 
different conditions appeared when the paper rubbish was finally 
swept away, and the newly stabilized mark system was established. 
Then emerged the situation which has been considered elsewhere — 
that of a stable currency, which it was designed to keep on a par 
with specie, but which had the essential characteristics of a gold 
exchange system. 
We return to the main proposition ; namely, that depreciating 
paper does not in itself lead to rates of foreign exchange that wil 
stimulate either exports or imports. As with almost every general 
proposition on these matters, there are cases w. «93 De regarded 
as exceptions to the rule. One such played a large purt in the 
paper exchanges of the post-war period. Depreciating paper may 
bring about the “flight of capital.” Tnvestors may become uneas 
from continued depreciation, may fear complete collaps: and may 
wish to place their possessions in secure form. They will then buy 
gold exchange, sending the funds to foreign banks; or may buy 
foreign securities. Germans and Frenchmen during the ominous 
stages bought dollar exchange, Swiss exchange, sterling exchange, 
or else securities of these countries. The rates, in terms of francs 
or marks for dollars, Swiss francs, pounds sterling, not only rose, 
but rose more than domestic prices. And this disproportionate rise 
operated tostimulate exports. A bounty arose in just the same way 
as it does when governments use paper money at the outset for 
meeting their own foreign engagements. I suspect that it was 
operation of the latter, direct purchase of foreign exchange by 
government, which played the largest part in the bounty 
experienced (so long as conditions had any calculability) in Ger- 
many, in 1924-25, whereas it was the flight of capital that played 
the more important part during the depreciation of the French 
franc. 
Such a flicht of capital is a natural or at least presumable</div>
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