

through the processes of manufacture is increased and the exposure to accident, other things being equal, is proportionately greater.

Apparently, then, this recent increase in the number and severity of accidents is not a mysterious thing, after all, but appears as a natural concomitant of the increased intensity of the industrial process. It is not surprising that this era of increased productivity, an era which is so striking that it may even be called the modern industrial revolution, should have among its other important by-products an increase in the intensity of the industrial hazard.

While, however, there has been this recent increase in the hazard of industry per man-hour, production per man-hour has increased so much more rapidly that the hazard in terms of production has decreased. Today a barrel of flour, a pair of shoes, an automobile, or a barrel of cement can be made with less loss of life and limb than ever before.

These two facts together form a striking antithesis: less accidents measured in terms of things produced; more things produced, however, so that the result, after all, is more accidents. If industrial well-being is to be measured in terms of goods produced, then this condition is satisfactory. If industrial well-being is to be measured in terms of working conditions, then the situation is unfavorable and even alarming. There will be a general agreement that the latter criterion is the more fundamental. We cannot view with composure a condition that makes a man's working life more hazardous under any circumstances.

It is, therefore, with no sense of complacency that we view this modern condition, but with a determination that accidents must be decreased, not merely in terms of goods produced, but in actual number as well. The first years of the safety movement were spent in clearing up the accumulated bad conditions that were the result of years of neglect, and results were comparatively easy to produce. The new safety movement will be very different, for it will have to meet, not static conditions, but the increasingly difficult conditions of an industry that is continuously growing more intense.

This, then, is the modern problem, the problem that definitely underlies this present study: how can accidents be controlled under modern industrial conditions, conditions that are becoming continuously more difficult? The question arises: "Can they be controlled? Perhaps, after all, with an increasing intensity of industry an increasing hazard is inevitable." The answer is a simple one, and not only conclusive, but suggestive of the solution in general; the answer is, namely, that individual cases exist, characterized also by high industrial efficiency, in which this control has been secured. The United States Steel Corporation in thirteen years has decreased its accidents