

PART I. INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE labour problem for a State compelled to throw the whole of its resources into the conduct of a war is, in the phrase that gained currency during the late war, the problem of man-power. The effort that can be exerted by any State is automatically restricted or extended first by the numbers of men and women available either for the services in the field or at home, and secondly by the use, ordered or disorderly, that is made of those services. Apart, therefore, from the skill of commanders by land or sea, the diplomatic resources of statesmen, the valour and resolution of the Forces, there is no single factor in a modern war which contributes so much to defeat or victory as the failure or success in handling the man-power problem, which, if the war is prolonged, is ultimately the problem of making one man or woman do the work of one and a quarter or even of one and a half.

The State must dispose its man-power so as to serve all the four following needs simultaneously and as fully as possible :

1. A sufficient supply of men, of whatever military age be decreed, physically fit for fighting, must be provided to supply and replenish the Forces.
2. The larger the combatant forces the greater will be the number of men and women required at home to equip, clothe, and feed the Forces.
3. While the normal ranks of industry will be heavily drained for these two purposes, it will be imperative to provide the labour which will guarantee the provision of the necessities for the civilian population, i. e. food, heat, light, clothes, transport, &c.
4. Finally, as the war continues, the strain on the financial resources of the country, and particularly upon its