The Stock Market Crash—And After 
ginning of July. Mr. Babson's statement, which 
ordinarily would have made little impression, 
coupled with the Hatry failure in London, which 
obliged English holders of American stocks to sell 
in order to protect their own commitments, directed 
attention to the overextension of stock market 
credits and the unsound banking condition. The 
statement by Philip Snowden, British Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, that the “orgy of speculation” in this 
country had been responsible for the advance in the 
rediscount rate of the Bank of England, whether it 
was true or not, had a depressing effect on the 
American market. Every fresh rumor sent the mar- 
ket lower. 
4 
Meanwhile the unusual ease’ in the money market 
was helped by the heavy accumulation of funds in 
New York as the result of subscriptions to new capi- 
tal issues. The call-money rate, which had run above 
15 per cent during the height of the summer specu- 
lation, fell to 6 per cent, then to 5 per cent, and later 
to 414 per cent. Corporations piled in their large 
loanable balances. The Reserve Banks continued 
as active buyers of bankers’ acceptances, which en- 
abled the member banks to reduce their indebtedness 
to the Reserve to the lowest figures reached since 
1927. Soon thereafter the volume of commercial 
loans dropped off, releasing further credits to aid 
liquidation in a falling market. 
October was the first month to show greatly re- 
duced totals of new stock issues floated. Foreigners 
were ordering their holdings of stocks sold out.