130 WESTERN HEMISPHERE IMMIGRATION

it was decided that the son of a German father and a Japanese mother is not a
“white person’ within the meaning of the naturalization laws. It was held in
the case of Ozawa v. United States by the United States Supreme Court that a
Japanese was not of the white race and that therefore he was not entitled to
naturalization as a United States citizen. In the case of In re Geronimo Para,
the petitioner for admission to United States citizenship was a South American
Indian and his petition was denied. The petitioner claimed that by reason of
service in the naval forces of the United States during the World War he was
eligible for citizenship, notwithstanding the fact that he was of the South American
Indian race. The court held that naturalization is, under any circumstances,
restricted to free white persons and persons of African nativity or deseent. In
the case of In re Camille, the court held that a person of half white and half
Indian blood is not a “white person’ within the meaning of this phrase as used
in the naturalization laws. The father of this person was a white Canadian,
and his mother an Indian woman of British Columbia, and he was, therefore, of
half Indian blood. In the case of In re Burton, the court held that an Indian
born in British Columbia can not be admitted to citizenship by naturalization
in the United States.
Such is the judicial criterion for admission to citizenship in the United States
for persons born in other countries. According to this test the vast majority of
the peoples living in the nonquota countries to the south of us are ineligible for
citizenship. It is difficult to see how the court could hold otherwise, except in
the case of those persons living there who can properly be designated as “white”
or “Caucasian,” the burden of proof being upon the person seeking admission
to the United States. The immigration act of 1924 states that all persons
ineligible for citizenship under our naturalization laws shall be excluded from
the United States. Here would seem to be one effective basis for the restriction
of these nonquota immigrants from Latin America, the Philippines, and the
West Indies.
Perhaps you will recall, Congressman Box, that you raised this point in the
hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization:
“Mr. Box. Do you know whether or not a Mexican Indian is eligible for
United States citizenship?
“Mr. TavLor. I do not know.
“Mr. Box. Is not the chairman himself of the opinion that a Mexican Indian
is not eligible to United States citizenship?
‘“The CuarrMan. I am satisfied that the particular type we have in mind at
this moment are not eligible for citizenship. }
“Mr. Box. Then if he is not eligible for citizenship he is not admissible to the
United States under the immigration act of 1924. -
“The CuamrMaN. Yes; that is right.”
It could be expected that such action would bring a storm of protest from our
State Department. Yet it is to be remembered that it was the State Department
which protested vigorously against the enactment of this identical provision into
the present law to exclude the oriental immigrant, and, in particular, the Japanese.
We could doubtless expect some formal protest from the countries concerned.
Yet as in the case of Japan, we should not swerve from the path of duty, for otherwise
 we shall be laying up for ourselves problems vastly greater than any that
could possibly arise from such action on our part at the present time,
That the people of southern California regard Mexicans as coming under this
interpretation is evident from the fact that in order to accomplish a domiciliary
isolation of Mexicans, ownership and occupancy of property are limited to
‘persons of the Caucasian races.” Doctor Taylor cites the following as a typical
restriction clause which usually runs for a period of 10 to 25 years: “The said
party of the second part will not sell, transfer, or assign premises here conveyed,
or any interest therein, to any person or persons of any other than the Caucasian
race, and that he will not permit or allow said premises to be occupied or used by
any person or persons of other than the Caucasian race.”
Doctor Taylor adds: “The deed restrictions, however, are not so much the
means of restricting residence of Mexicans as they are evidence of the social
feeling which enforces the restriction even beyond the limits of the tracts actually
restricted. As a matter of fact, the deed restrictions themselves are not always
enforced to the legal limit. It is known that in a number of residence sections
limited to Caucasians there are occasional Mexican owners who are not of pure
Caucasian descent.”
Likewise, he points out that “frequently one sees such signs in restaurant
windows as ‘ We serve white trade only.’ Sometimes this refers to Negroes, but