

the detriment of others, and their wrongful act would affect the established system of justice, would disrupt social unity, provoke a reaction of public opinion, would alter the ends of life itself, and seriously menace the fundamental principles of natural justice upon which the peace and welfare of a community are utterly dependent. All of these considerations form the basis of both municipal and international common law, and they might properly complement the conception of equality of States in the international sphere and thus explain their responsibility.

It could not be properly stated that there are two conceptions of responsibility, one in reference to individuals, and the other pertaining to States; for they are both responsible in the same light, this being essential to the preservation of peace within the State and among the States. This is indeed a practical notion derived from the highest spirit of justice and comity, imposed by logic itself as a paramount necessity of human existence, and thus impressed upon the mind of man. The doctrine of legal responsibility is unique, and its ground is identical in both municipal and international jurisprudence. This unity of the law has already been set forth in doctrine. The pronouncement of the Institute of International Law at its session held in New York, attributing international character to the rights of man, has discarded the distinctions between the two systems of jurisprudence, and has constituted an International Community as the common guardian of both the individual and the body politic. The rules of conduct which constitute the *corpus* of the law are applied to human relations throughout the world; and in the strict juridical conception, these relations are precisely identical between individuals and between States. However, their differences arise mainly when it is realized that in the relations of individuals, responsibility and the law are enforced by a perfectly organized system, which is afforded security by a constituted authority; whereas, in the international sphere, although the very same principles hold true, they have not been yet fully developed. It would be a task beset with difficulties, to undertake the co-ordination of the relations of States with one another, or of the character of the International Community. These cannot be considered voluntary in the sense that States might do without them and live in utter isolation, nor are they subject to rules established by the States' arbitrary will. There is in evidence a certain sense of obligation in this International Community, and although its working organization is now in the making, it can only differ from individual organization in its degree of development.

There is an International Community in the juridical sphere, dedicated to preserve order and peace among the Nations of the World, and founded upon the highest sense of justice. Its administration demands that each one of the constituent members of the Family of Nations should hold due respect towards contractual obligations and observe the general accepted rules and