<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0">
  <teiHeader>
    <fileDesc>
      <titleStmt>
        <title>Agricultural relief</title>
      </titleStmt>
      <publicationStmt />
      <sourceDesc>
        <bibl>
          <msIdentifier>
            <idno>1831934515</idno>
          </msIdentifier>
        </bibl>
      </sourceDesc>
    </fileDesc>
  </teiHeader>
  <text>
    <body>
      <div>274 
AGRICULTURAL RELIEF 
Mr. FuLmer. Doctor, right there. Is it your understanding that 
with a normal crop and fair prices there would not be any equaliza- 
tion fee; that they could operate without it? 
Mr. KILGORE. Yes. . 
Mr. FuLmer. And then if there should be a surplus it would bring 
about the equalization fee, which would bring to the notice of every 
rower the overproduction, which would tend to stabilize pro- 
duction? - 
Mr. KiLcore. Yes, sir. And I want, Mr. Chairman, to get 
straight with Mr. Clarke. You gentlemen are good judges of human 
nature. A man in public life must be either a good judge of human 
nature or a man of unusual parts; he may be both—Congressmen 
are. 
Mr. CrLarkE. Or his constituents may be poor judges. 
Mr. KiLcore. I believe if we take the human nature side of people 
into considration, other things being equal—I only mention that to 
illustrate my point—that they want to belong to cooperative asso- 
ciations and, as Mr. Bledsoe said here the other day, they will belong 
to cooperatives if you give them equal advantages in price in the 
cooperatives; because they get the advantage of their own technical 
employees in grading and stapling their cotton or other crops, so that 
they will get the advantage of quality in price. 
Now, there is a very distinct advantage there that a man would 
have to pull him over into a cooperative, providing the other things 
are equal, even. 
And then you have this other big advantage that we hear a great 
deal about, and that is the combined bargaining power that would go 
with a group of farmers and which the individual farmer does not 
have. I think there are those two main advantages if we had this 
compulsory pooling of the surplus, strictly speaking, compulsory 
contribution of the equalization fee for use in pooling the surplus or 
more that would induce the nonmember—he would not be forced— 
but there would be advantages in getting quality price for quality 
product and then the bargaining power of volume of product that 
would carry the nonmember into the cooperative associations. 
Further than that, gentlemen, public sentiment in this country, I 
believe, is in favor of cooperative marketing by farmers. There has 
not been any question, social, economic, or political, that has had the 
publicity, that has had the support, I think, that cooperative marketing 
has had in these last five years. Cooperatives are practically a unit 
for this bill. 
Congress has passed important legislation in favor of cooperative 
marketing: The Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, the intermediate 
credits act of 1923, the cooperative marketing bill in the Department 
of Agriculture in 1926. The action of Congress has been general for 
Tooperative marketing. Now, is supported by that public sentinemt. 
To President has not sent a message to Congress or made an address 
jn Wars as any appropriateness to refer to agriculture in, except 
po ade some statement, in favor of cooperative marketing. 
entiment 1s for cooperative marketing, and with compulsory pooling 
of surplus, the cooperatives can succeed.’ 
sal; Us would n% inducement to bring the nonmembers into the 
rood hime: would not be compulsory, but it would be just real 
2 an nature and economic advantage.</div>
    </body>
  </text>
</TEI>
