AGRICULTURAL RELIEF

395

When President Coolidge vetoed the McNary-Haugen bill last February it
became evident that if “equality for agriculture” is to be secured during the
present administration, a bill must be drafted which either he will not veto
or which can be passed over his veto.

The President's veto message, as well as his attitude since the issuance of
that message, makes unmistakably clear that no bill providing for an * equal-
ization fee” ean receive his approval.

Moreover, the fact that 74 Democratic Congressmen and 20 Democratic Sena-
tors either voted or paired against the MeNary-Haugen bill, largely because
of their opposition to the ‘equalization fee,” makes equally clear that no
bill providing for an “equalization fee” can receive enough Democratic votes
to puss it over the President's veto.

Therefore, it would seem to be so apparent that he who runs may read. that
no bill providing for an “ equalization fee” ean be enacted into law during the
aext session of Congress, and that the advocates of “ farm relief ” will have to
do one of two things—either give up all hope of gaining economic justice for
the farmer during the coming session of Congress or else draft a new com-
promise bill, which will have enough “teeth” to make it satisfactory to the
Uentral West, and which at the same time can command the support of either
the Coolidge Republicans or of the southern Democrats,

I am convinced that a bipartisan compromise bill based on the export deben-
ture plan can be drafted that will achieve all that the MeNavy-Haugen bill
was designed to accomplish, while containing important safeguarding features
which it lacked.

Having worked on this problem since 1921, when I had the honor of having
introduced in Congress the first farm relief bill, the so-called ‘export credit
bill.” which passed the Senate by a unanimous vote and the House by a
two-thirds majority, only to be assassinated “in conference ” by two eastern
Congressmen, I am loath to see nonessential differences of opinion as to method
lefeat again, for the fourth time, this most urgently needed legislation.

I want to make clear that had I been in Congress last Year I would have
voted for the McNary-Haugen bill—which, whatever else it might or might
not have done, would have given us a Federal farm board, the functions of which
could have been enlarged or altered later. as the functions of the Interstate
(‘ommerce Commission repeatedly have been extended, by legislative action.

While 1 realize that some farmers would prefer to wait for relief legislation
‘wo or three years, if necessary—until a new President and Congress could
take action—rather than change in any way their position on the MeNary-
Haugen bill, others of us are more interested in getting prompt and practical
results, than we are in the means by which those results are achieved.

In brief, the bill in its final form should vontain, in my opinion, four main
features, all to be administered by a board, the members to he selected in a way
that will insure a sympathetic understanding bv them of the farmer's needs
and point of view.

The first job of the board. and one which would require its continuous at-
‘ention, would be to keep itself and the farmers of the country thoroughly
advised as to crop prospects, probable price trends. snd supply and demand both
at home and abroad.

This practical crop and price information service is capable of far greater
levelopment than anything at present available. If we had been fully informed
in the fall of 1926 of the fact that the world crop of cotton was no larger than
that of the preceding vear. even though our own crop seemed «o tremendous. we
would have escaped the tragie slump in the price of cotton that ruined so many
southern farmers.

While this sort of market information would have been a big help, suppose
‘hat, in addition, means had been provided to lend cooperative growers, ginners,
and dealers up to S85 per cent of the fair conservative value of the cotton held,
and at the lowest feasible rate of interest. It ix plain that under these con-
ditions few holders would have sold their cotton at the then ruinouslv low
prices. and the market would have sagged but little. if at all.

One section of the proposed bill should provide for the loaning in this way
nf upward of $300,000,000, in an effort to prevent undue depression in market
price levels. This sum of course would be augmented by funds available from
orivate-banking institutions, and the Federal intermediate-credit banks.

Storage from times of surplus to times of scarcity is just as necessary a
function to-day as it was in the days of Joseph. Despite our best calculations.