526 
{ AGRICULTURAL RELIEF 
depress a price during a period, whether that be short or long. That 
is the point I am trying to make. 
Now I will answer any question. 
Mr. KercEAaM. Mr. Anderson, I would like to have you complete 
your statement. 
Mr. AxpErsON. I am through with this part of it. 
Mr. Kercaam. But, I am wondering about how much time is 
involved, because I am sure there will be a considerable number of 
questions. 
Mr. AnpeErsoN. I am through with this general part of the state- 
ment, and I recognize how difficult it is to follow through a long 
statement and then go back to questions which one wants to ask in 
connection with particular portions of it. As I say, I am through 
with this particular general statement, and if I can be in any way, 
with my modest ability, helpful to the committee in connection with 
the general problem, I am delighted to do it. 
Mr. KincHELOE. I think you made a very fine distinction there 
between the Federal Reserve Board and this proposed farm board. 
But do you think their duties and responsibilities are anywise parallel? 
Mr. AxpeErsoN. The objects, of course, are quite different. 1 
only used the illustration because it had been used by others, and it 
seemed to me that the illustration was susceptible of interpretations 
which were not entirely justified. 
The point I am trying to make here is this: It is perfectly clear, I 
think—I do not think anyone would deny it, in the Federal Reserve 
System or out of it—that by a manipulation of the reserve rates and 
by open-market transactions you could have a direct effect upon the 
level of prices; at least for a period. But if you attempted to do 
that you would probably have a far greater fluctuation in those 
prices than you have now. The difficulty either in the case of credit 
or in the case of attempting to stimulate the price of a crop is this: 
In addition to the market effect of your stabilization organization, 
you also have the market effect of actions of everybody else who is 
dealing in that commodity. 
If, for example, the board or the organizations promoted by it 
started out at the beginning of the crop year with a price of $1 a 
bushel for wheat and with the idea of stimulating the price to $1.25 
a bushel, a lot of other people would immediately start buying wheat 
also In order to get the benefit of the rise in price. The result might 
easily be a stimulation of the price to $1.50 a bushel or more, with 
the consequent drop in the price unless the board or other organiza- 
flons were able to maintain it upon the higher level. This might 
prove impossible. 
Mr. FurmEer. Right there, I understand that under this bill the 
speculator would have an advantage because of the holding of the 
surplus he would be able to ride the market. in other words. bull the 
market. 
Mr. AnpErsoN. He might do that. A lot of people have been 
trying to do that in stock for a long time, and some have made money 
and a lot of them have lost an awful lot. 
The point I am trying to make is not that it is not possible, pro- 
viding your fundamental principle is right, to bring about a certain 
degree of stabilization. But I do not think it is possible, except by 
feeling your way into the proposition—bv letting evervbody know