AGRICULTURAL RELIEF

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anks; and if it does we can look the future in the face with courage and conence.


Now, following that——
Mr. ANDRESEN. What date was that?
Mr. Apkins. May 18, 1920.
Mr. ANDRESEN. Was that President Harding?
Mr. Apkins. No; that was Harding, the governor of the Federal
Reserve Board. I should have specified more particularly, but I
thought everybody understood that.
Now, what further confirms in my mind the object sought in this
matter being carried out, you can go over here to the Congressional
Library to read the Manufacturers’ Record about what Mr. McAdoo
said about that in December. This was December 23, 1920. Mr.
McAdoo, after they had put their program of raising the rediscount
rate into effect, made a special reference to the farmer:

We can not excuse inaction nor dismiss the matter with a mere observation
that deflation is necessary and that farmers must take their medicine along
with the rest of the country. * * * When colossal losses like those the
farmers are now sustaining overtake them, every line of industry suffers, factories
 close, business shrinks, labor is thrown out of emplovment, and confidence
s seriously shaken. * * *
[t is the imperative duty of those in civil authority and of those who control
credit to exercise their powers so as to prevent needless distress and preserve
confidence.
Now, at the time Mr. McAdoo made this statement this was the
situation, taken from the records of the Chicago Board of Trade:
In July, 1920, No. 3 corn sold in Chicago for $1.53 per bushel.
When Mr. McAdoo made this statement this same grade of corn was
selling on the Chicago market for 73 cents per bushel. and the following
 June sold for 60 cents per bushe.
And the same thing: I have gone to the Chicago markets on No. 2
red winter wheat, on cattle and hogs, where about the same proportion
 of losses in prices were apparent at the time Mr. McAdoo made
the statement, and he felt so alarmed that he thought that some
immediate action should be taken about not putting the rediscount
rate up to such an extent that it was necessary for those fellows to
shove all their stuff on the market and ruin the country. So that to
my mind and from the record made, not only from the President of
the United States but the Federal Reserve Board and the reaction
we got from our markets, led me to a firm conclusion that the primary
object at that time of increasing the rediscount rates was to lower
the price of wheat; and evidently it had that effect, did it not?
Mr. Anperson. It had that effect. You are entitled to vour opinion
 on the subject. .
Mr. Apkins. I am quoting from the record.
Mr. AswerLL. May I ask a question?
Mr. ANDERSON (continuing). And I know you are entitled to draw
such conclusions from that record as you want to draw, but having
gone into the proposition to some extent, I do not agree with the
conclusions you have reached, and we can not agree about it.
Mr. Apkins. That is fair.
Mr. Fort. Is it not true, richt on this point, Mr. Anderson, that
simultaneously with these low prices for commodities of the agricultural
 nature of other commodities. practically speaking they suffer