558

( AGRICULTURAL RELIEF
or, if there are none such, with private agencies, for the purpose of the
purchase, withholding and disposal of the surplus of the commodity.

Now, if you attempt to visualize the contract which the board must
make with these agencies, I think you will find that there are probably
only three alternatives. The board must in some way fix its liability
or the liability of the stabilization fund for these losses, costs, and
charges. The board must in some way fix what the ultimate liability
as a consequence of these operations may be.

The board, I suppose, might conceivably—although it would be
very difficult to conceive of a Government board operating in that
way—simply give to these agencies or an agency the authority to
purchase the surplus; with carte blanche as to the price at which it
should buy, the amount which it should buy and the prices at which
it should sell, and the conditions under which it could sell. Per-
sonally, I can not conceive of any Government board functioning in
that way. If it did, we might just as well not have a board, because
the operation of the entire system then becomes a matter of the
judgment of the agencies and not a matter of the judgment of the
board.

The second possibility in the contract is that the board might itself
undertake to give directions to the agency as to the amount that
should be purchased, the time at which it should be purchased, what
grades should be purchased, and the prices to be paid, and also similar
directions with reference to the sales that could be made.

Commercially, I do not think that is possible. But if it is possible
it is clear that the board in that case must have in mind and definitely
in mind the price basis upon which it expects to buy and sell.

Mr. Menges. Could not the board have that information?

Mr. ANDERSON. What is that?

Mr. MencEs. Could not the board have that information?

Mr. ANDERSON. Oh, yes; I think perhaps it could. The only
point I am making here is that the board would have to have in mind
the price at which these agencies would buy and sell, and that it is
impossible for them to have that in mind without involving in these
operations the objection which the President makes that it provides
for price fixing.

Mr. Mexces. That price, according to your argument, if I get you,
would be on the basis of supply and demand, would it not?

Mr. ANDERSON. No; not necessarily so. If I were doing it it would
be; but under this bill T do not think it would be. Under this bill
the price would be a price fixed by the board with the idea, I take it,

of making the tariff fully effective irrespective of the supply and
demand relation which might be effective at the time.

Mr. MENGEs. Mr. Anderson, I disagree with you there. I think
the board would have in mind the supply and demand.

Mr. AxpErsoN. The board could not, of course, operate without
knowing something about what it was doing?

Mr. MENGES. Surely.

Mr. ANpErsoN. That is perfectly clear.

Mr. Menges. I think that this board would be composed of men
who know, and if they do not know we will have to get rid of them.

Mr. ANpErsoN. The only complaint I make here is, that, basing it
on my own judgment and interpretation of what the bill means, it
can not operate without meeting the objections of the President that

it does provide for price fixing.