LABOUR AND THE CONSTITUTION. 459
standards in different provinces, and the advantages to be gained from
sloser contact with local conditions do not outweigh the grave disad-
vantages which the: loss of central machinery would bring. Burma,
as we have already recognised, presents peculiar problems and, while
we are satisfied that it has benefited greatly in respect of labour matters
by its inclusion in the Indian Empire, we consider that there is not the
same need for the maintenance of uniformity with India as there is in
the case of the Indian provinces.
Opinion on the Question.

These considerations appear to be fully appreciated already,
for the witnesses who appeared before us were overwhelmingly in favour
of central legislation. We met none among Government officials,
representatives of employers or representatives of labour who favoured
the withdrawal of the power to legislate in respect of labour matters
from the Central Legislature. While it was not suggested that pro-
vincial legislatures should be deprived of any power which they now
possess, the view is widely held that legislation on an all-India scale is
ordinarily preferable. We observe that the Reports of the All-Parties
Conference of 1928, of the Indian Statutory Commission and of
the Federal Structure sub-Committee of the Indian Round Table
Conference all contemplate central labour legislation. We also are
convinced that the objections to the complete provincialisation of labour
legislation are so great that every effort should be directed towards
avoiding this course.

Central Authority over Administration.

There are, however, certain difficulties connected with central,
legislation which must be faced. As a rule those who have given
svidence before us have been impressed by the advantages which have
resulted from the present arrangement, by which the more important
labour laws are passed by the Central Legislature and administered by
the provincial Governments. But there are important factors in the
present position which are likely to be profoundly modified under any
future constitution. In the first place, the Central Government have at
present the power of superintendence, direction and control. If in
practice this has involved no close supervision over administration,
it has been of assistance in preventing the value of legislation being
impaired by lax administration. Another factor which has probably
been more valuable in securing smooth working has been the tradi-
bon of the past. The system of administration was devised in a period
when the authority of the Central Government was complete, and
the actual administration has remained largely in the hands of men who
had been responsible for it prior to the Reforms. The inherent diffi-
culties of the position are also minimised by the fact that the side of
the provincial Government which is responsible for administration is
n0t at present responsible to the local legislature. It is impossible to
assume that, as these factors change or disappear, the working of a
system, which gives responsibility for policy to the centre and for
administration to the provinces, will remain unaffected. It seems to