LABOUR AND THE CONSTITUTION. 461
judge, the difficulties involved in this combination are not likely to be
confined to the sphere of labour, and we do not doubt that methods can
be devised for surmounting them. If the links which have hitherto
been effective are weakened or disappear, fresh links will arise and
can. be created. The development of responsibility in both the central
and provincial spheres should prove a useful new bond, and as legislatures
hecome increasingly representative, the tie will be strengthened.
We propose later the establishment of special machinery which should
go a considerable distance towards meeting the difficulty, and this is
not the least of the advantages it is designed to secure. But it
will not in itself be sufficient for this purpose, and we would emphasise
the need of invoking all such means as are reconcilable with. the general
principles of the constitution, to make it certain that any legislation
adopted is generally effective.
Financing of Legislation.

Another difficulty is that arising out of the financial effects
of legislation. Under the present constitution the central legislature can
pass laws involving a tax on the revenues of provincial governments
without the assent of these governments. The number of factories
coming under regulation depends on a central Act; but the provintes
have to pay for the necessary inspectors. The Workmen's Compensation,
Act is a central Act ; but the Commissioners whose appointment it required
had to be supplied by the provinces. Hitherto the inherent difficulties
of the position have not been prominent, mainly because legislation at the
sentre has not made any demands on the provinces except for administra-
tive expenses which have been, and usually will be, comparatively small.
But there is an important field of labour legislation which may involve
substantial expenditure on the part of the State. Schemes of social
insurance and various forms of social benefit may be linked with State
sontributions and State grants, and, apart from these, may require the
imposition of substantial taxation. While we do not regard these con-
siderations as justifying the withdrawal of labour legislation, even in
part, from the Central Legislature, we must stress the importance of
avoiding the possibility of the adoption of laws involving large charges
on provincial revenues, without the assent of all the provinces affected.
There are various means by which this could be arranged, but the discus-
sion of these would take us far outside our proper sphere.

Central and Provincial Legislation.

It is relevant, however, to observe in this connection that the
issue, as it presents itself to us, is not whether all labour legislation should
or should not be central, but whether it is not desirable that the centre,
as well as the provinces, should retain the power of legislation. We
believe that there is a wide field for provincial legislation. In particular,
there are valuable possibilities of experiments in new directions on a pro-
vincial scale. On the merits of the whole case, we have no hesitation
in recommending that legislative powers in respect of labour should
continue with the Central Legislature and thatthe provincial legislatures