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        <title>A critical dissertation on the nature, measures and causes of value</title>
        <author>
          <persName>
            <forname>Samuel</forname>
            <surname>Bailey</surname>
          </persName>
        </author>
      </titleStmt>
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          <msIdentifier>
            <idno>1858887097</idno>
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      <div>CHAPTER 1. 
ON THE NATURE OF VALUE. 
VALUE, in its ultimate sense, appears to mean 
the esteem in which any object is held. It de- 
notes, strictly speaking, an effect produced on the 
mind ; but as we are accustomed in other cases 
to give a common name to a feeling and to 
the cause which has excited it, and to blend 
them together in our thoughts, so in this case 
we regard value as a quality of external ob- 
jects. Colour and fragrance, for example, are 
words which designate both the cause and the 
effect, both the material quality which produces 
the feeling in the mind, and the feeling pro- 
duced. The philosopher, however, is the only 
one who discerns the distinction, and colour 
and fragrance are never thought of by the ge-</div>
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