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        <title>A critical dissertation on the nature, measures and causes of value</title>
        <author>
          <persName>
            <forname>Samuel</forname>
            <surname>Bailey</surname>
          </persName>
        </author>
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            <idno>1858887097</idno>
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      <div>ON THE NATURE 
any others. But it will be found, that, in speak- 
ing of the value of a being equal to the value 
of B, we are led to use the expression by the 
constant reference which we unavoidably make 
to the relations of these commodities to other 
commodities, particularly to money, and the 
import of our language, in its whole extent, is, 
that a and B bear an equal relation to a third 
commodity, or to commodities in general. 
It is from this circumstance of constant re- 
ference to other commodities, or to money, 
when we are speaking of the relation between 
any two commodities, that the notion of value, 
as something intrinsic and absolute, has arisen. 
When we compare objects with each other as 
exchangeable commodities, two relations ne- 
cessarily mix themselves in our comparison — 
the mutual relation of the objects, and their re- 
lations to other objects; and it is these latter 
which occasion the semblance of absolute 
value, because they seem independent of the 
former, which is the immediate object of our 
attention. Indeed, it is generally by their re- 
lation to a third commodity, that we can at all</div>
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