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        <title>A critical dissertation on the nature, measures and causes of value</title>
        <author>
          <persName>
            <forname>Samuel</forname>
            <surname>Bailey</surname>
          </persName>
        </author>
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            <idno>1858887097</idno>
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      <div>']0)

ON THE CAUSES

one hand, whether any circumstance assigned
as a cause can be correctly admitted to rank under
 this denomination, and, on the other hand,
whether any circumstance alleged to have no
influence can be justly excluded.
It was explained in the first chapter, that
value, although spoken of as a quality adhering
 to external objects, or as a relation between
 them, implies a feeling or state of mind,
which manifests itself in the determination of
the will. This feeling or state of mind may be
the result of a variety of considerations connected
 with exchangeable commodities, and an
inquiry into the causes of value is, in reality, an
inquiry into those external circumstances, which
operate so steadily upon the minds of men, in
the interchange of the necessaries, comforts,
and conveniences of life, as to be subjects of
inference and calculation. These circumstances
 may either act directly on the mind, as
considerations immediately influencing its views,
or they may operate indirectly, by only causing
certain uniform considerations to be presented</div>
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