[ 30] 
compulsion. It is for them now freely to decide that 
they will come in until they wish to go out, rather 
than stay out until they wish to come in. The sacra- 
fice is not great. Self-interest, loyalty and patriotism 
dictate an immediate, if provisional, inclusion. 
If they elect to remain out, Nationalists cannot be 
blamed for making their position uncomfortable. If 
they elect to come in, Nationalists have the strongest 
motives for generous conciliation. Their duty to 
their brother Unionists ; their duty to their country ; 
above all, their loyalty to the Empire in the hour of 
stress and trial, combine to urge that they should 
throw in their lot with a United Ireland. Sir Horace 
Plunkett, a life-long Unionist, writes: “No sane 
Irishman believes that Ulster can be coerced, but all 
the best Irish thought is confident it can be won.” 
The sooner the better. If the thing is to be done at 
all, “’twere well ’twere done quickly.” “Time is,” as 
the lawyers say, “of the essence of the contract” If 
the six counties of Ulster consented to inclusion they 
might reasonably demand a Coalition Ministry as the 
price of the concession, and experience in England 
shows that it is in war-time a Coalition Ministry is most 
successful. Seeing that Mr. Asquith and Mr. Bonar 
Law, after such bitter conflict, worked harmoniously 
together, there is surely no reason to despair of 
hearty co-operation of Unionist and Home Ruler in 
a Coalition Cabinet in Ireland. Party rancour would 
be quenched, and kindly feeling evoked by their 
common interest in the successful progress of the 
war. The immediate creation of an United Irish 
Parliament would be an irresistible stimulus to Irish 
recruiting ; would dissipate whatever lingering hopes 
Germany may yet entertain of Irish disaffection, and 
would be cordially welcomed in America and the 
Colonies. 
The Irish Unionist Press can do much to promote 
such a settlement, which I am convinced the vast