M. VENIZELOS

I13

(p. 48), upholding ‘a neutrality which would be useful to
Germany’.
At the beginning of October, 1915, General von Mackensen
began his great campaign against Serbia. On October 7,
Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and invaded Serbia.
The Serbs called on Greece to fulfil her obligations under
2 defensive alliance which the two States had concluded
after the Second Balkan War.
On September 25, 1915, M. Venizelos had asked the
English and French ministers whether, in the event of
Bulgaria making war upon Serbia, Great Britain and
France would provide the 150,000 men which under the
Serbo-Greek Treaty Serbia was bound to put in the field.
Greece could provide her contingent, but Serbia, having
already mobilized ‘all her forces, could do no more. The
British and French Governments at once agreed to undertake
 Serbia’s obligations. This appears to be as far as
matters went between the Allies and M. Venizelos up to
the time of the landing of Allied troops at Salonika, which
began on October 2. According to M. Venizelos’s own
account, which there is no reason to doubt, he was surprised
by the landing, and had neither invited it nor consented to it.2
The justification of the Allies’ landing at Salonika does
not lie, therefore, in any invitation of M. Venizelos, but
in the rights which by treaty the Allies possessed. The
documents on which those rights depended were the
Protocol of February 3, 1830, the Treaty of May 7, 1832,
and the Treaty of July 13, 1863. The Protocol stipulates,
by Article VIII, that

No troops belonging to one of these Contracting
Powers shall be allowed to enter the territory of the New
Greek State without the consent of the two other Courts

+ The treaty was made on May 19—June 1, 1913. Itwas published
as a White Book by the Venizelos Government on August 18, 1917.
See Diplomatika Engrapha (AimAwparikd "Eyypoda), 1913-17, pp. 6-21.
3 See article in The New Europe, November 9, 1916, by R. M.
Burrows, ‘ Absolutism in Greece and our Treaty Rights’.
1903