114 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE
who signed the Treaty [i. e. the Treaty of July 6, 1827,
see p. 106].
This protocol ‘was agreed to by the Porte and by the
Greek Government, and the guarantee of 1832 was by
treaty declared to depend upon its terms.
Greece under the sovereignty of Prince Otho of Bavaria
and under the guarantee of the three Courts, shall form
a monarchical and independent State, according to the
terms of the Protocol signed between the said courts, on
the 3rd February 1830, and accepted both by Greece
and by the Ottoman Porte.

By these Acts, Great Britain, France, and Russia
guaranteed the independence of Greece, but bound themselves
 only to land troops to maintain that guarantee with
the assent of the guaranteeing Powers. The guarantee
could be put into effect only if Greece was ceasing to be
monarchical and independent. In 1863, however, this new
treaty of guarantee inserted a fresh condition :
Greece under the sovereignty of Prince William of
Denmark and the guarantee of the three Courts, forms
a, monarchical, independent, and constitutional State.

The guarantee was thenceforth to become operative if
Greece was in danger of losing her independence or her
monarchical or constitutional government. The Allies
could therefore claim in the autumn of 1915 that although
Greece was remaining monarchical, its independence was
in danger, owing to action of the Central Powers, and that
it was ceasing to be constitutional, and was becoming
absolutist.! For King Constantine dismissed M. Venizelos,
1 Dr. Burrows (loc. cit.) points out that the British Foreign Office
in the Parl. Paper recording ‘Treaties containing guarantees or
engagements by Great Britain in regard to the territory or government
 of other countries’ (Cd. 9088, July 1898), quotes the Protocol
of 1830, but omits the clause respecting armed intervention. He
suggests that this omission may account for the fact that the British
Government, after the landing at Salonika in October 1913, gave the
‘invitation’ of M. Venizelos as justification. This is unfortunate,
as M. Venizelos did not intend to convey an invitation, while the
treaty rights of the Allies amply justify the intervention.